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ABSTRACT 
 
License Buyback Programs in Commercial Fisheries: An Application to the Shrimp 
Fishery in the Gulf of Mexico.  (May 2009) 
Aaron T. Mamula, B.A., Oregon State University; 
M.A, Southern Methodist University 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Richard T. Woodward 
     Dr. Wade L. Griffin 
   
 
 This dissertation provides a thorough analysis of the costs associated with, and 
efficacy of, sequential license buyback auctions.  I use data from the Texas Shrimp 
License Buyback Program – a sequential license buyback auction – to estimate the 
effects of a repeated game set-up on bidding behavior.  I develop a dynamic econometric 
model to estimate parameters of the fisherman’s optimal bidding function in this auction.  
The model incorporates the learning that occurs when an agent is able to submit bids for 
the same asset in multiple rounds and is capable of distinguishing between the 
fisherman’s underlying valuation of the license and the speculative premium induced by 
the sequential auction.  I show that bidders in the sequential auction do in fact inflate 
bids above their true license valuation in response to the sequential auction format. 
 The results from our econometric model are used to simulate a hypothetical 
buyback program for capacity reduction in the offshore shrimp fishery in the Gulf of 
Mexico using two competing auction formats: the sequential auction and the one-time 
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auction.  I use this simulation analysis to compare the cost and effectiveness of 
sequential license buyback program relative to one-time license buyback programs.  I 
find that one-time auctions, although they impose a greater up-front cost on the 
management agency – are capable of retiring more fishing effort per dollar spent then 
sequential license buyback programs.  In particular, I find one-time license buyback 
auctions to be more cost effective than sequential ones because they remove the 
possibility for fishermen to learn about the agency’s willingness to pay function and use 
this information to extract sale prices in excess of the true license value. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Overfishing is currently a serious concern for fisheries managers in the US and 
around the globe.  In the March 2008 publication of the Fish Stock Sustainability Index 
(FSSI), the National Marine Fisheries Service reported that overfishing was occurring in 
22% of US stocks.  The FSSI also reports that 27% of domestic stocks are overfished.  In 
their 2006 report, “State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture (SOFIA),” the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations reported that 25% of the world’s fish 
stocks were overexploited. 
 The damage done to fish stocks through overfishing has a profound impact on 
marine ecosystems as well as human welfare.  Many coastal communities rely on 
commercial fishing to provide jobs and income.  When stocks become overfished the 
result is often economic hardship for these communities.  In addition to supporting the 
commercial fishing industry, healthy marine ecosystems also provide benefits to 
recreational fishermen and ecotourists. 
 In recognition of the importance of marine resources and the failure of open 
access policies to provide healthy marine environments, fisheries management has 
emerged as an important topic among resource economists.  The literature in resource 
and environmental economics now contains extensive discussions on the relative 
strengths of the various policies used to manage marine resources.  In this dissertation I        
 
 This dissertation follows the style of Marine Resource Economics.  
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focus on one particular class of fisheries management policies: buyback programs. 
Domestically, buyback programs have been used in the Northeast ground fish 
fishery, the Columbia River salmon fishery in Oregon and Washington and the Bearing 
Sea/Aleutian Islands (BSAI) crab fishery in Alaska among others.  Internationally, 
buyback programs have been used in the Australian Northern Prawn fishery, British 
Columbia salmon fishery, and Norwegian purse seine fishery (case studies of these and 
other buyback programs can be found in Holland, Gudmundsson, and Gates 1999 and 
Curtis and Squires 2007).     
In addition to being significant in number, many buyback programs come with a 
significant price tag.  In 2004 the vessel buyback program carried out in the BSAI crab 
fishery spent over $97 million.  The Texas Inshore Shrimp License Buyback Program, 
which will be discussed in detail in this dissertation, spent over $8 million in its first 7 
years.   
Buyback programs have traditionally found favor with fisheries managers 
because of their ability to address a range of management goals.  In addition to providing 
capacity reduction for the purpose of reducing overfishing, buyback programs may be 
designed to address the problem of by catch within a fishery or used as a way to 
distribute disaster relief funds.  Holland et al. (1999) identify three general policy aims 
important to fisheries managers which buyback programs may be designed to address: 1) 
conservation of fish stocks, 2) improvement of economic efficiency through fleet 
rationalization, and 3) providing transfer payments to the fishing industry.  Because of 
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their ability to address biological, economic, and social goals, buyback programs will 
likely continue to find a place in the manager’s toolkit.     
 Although the economic literature on buyback programs is well developed and 
contains a wealth of case studies, there seems to be a shortage of empirical work 
addressing the question of how important design issues impact the efficacy of the 
program.  In this dissertation I will analyze the influence that auction format has on the 
effectiveness of buyback programs.  Given their popularity with fisheries managers and 
the financial commitment required to run one successfully, it is crucial to have a 
thorough understanding of how agents respond to the incentives created by buyback 
programs and the bearing this behavior has on program success.   
The principal objectives of this dissertation are to develop an empirical model of 
bidding in a sequential buyback auction and, using results from this model, simulate 
sequential and one-time buyback programs for capacity reduction in the Gulf of Mexico 
Shrimp Fishery.  The overriding goal of our study is to analyze the cost and effectiveness 
of sequential buyback auctions relative to one-time buyback auctions.  I approach this 
goal in the following manner: 
I first develop an econometric model of bidding under a sequential auction.  The 
parameters of this model allow us to distinguish the license holder’s true reservation 
price and, by comparing this underlying value with actual bids, estimate the amount by 
which the bidder inflates his or her bid in order to take advantage of the sequential 
auction structure.  I term this bid inflation the speculative premium.  I then use data from 
the Texas Inshore Shrimp License Buyback Program – a long running sequential auction 
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– to estimate the parameters of the license holder’s bidding function and the implied 
speculative premium.   
I use our econometric findings to help solve a particular resource management 
problem – that of optimal design of a buyback auction.  By simulating 2 hypothetical 
buyback policies for capacity reduction of the commercial shrimp fishing fleet in the 
Gulf of Mexico, I provide a thorough evaluation of the costs and effectiveness of 
sequential buyback programs (SBs) relative to one-time buyback programs (OTBs).   
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter II will 
provide a thorough literature review on auctions.  In this chapter, I discuss the current 
economic literature on auction theory and estimation of models using auction data.  One 
of the contributions of this dissertation is the development of a dynamic model capable 
of incorporating the learning that occurs in sequential auctions.  Our auction literature 
review helps emphasize this contribution by presenting current approaches to modeling 
auctions. 
  Chapter IV contains the development of our formal econometric model and 
estimation results.  I believe that an intriguing feature of the SB auction is that bidders 
have an incentive to bid above their true valuation.  In the event that a bid is not accepted 
in the current period, the bidder will have another chance to participate in the auction 
again next period.  This fact leads bidders to attach a speculative premium to the true 
value of the license.  In Chapter IV I propose an econometric model capable of 
estimating this speculative premium and distinguishing it from the underlying value of 
the license. 
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In Chapter V I use our econometric results to inform a simulation model to 
compare SB auctions with OTB auctions.  Chapter V uses parameter estimates from our 
econometric model to predict bidding behavior for a hypothetical SB auction for capacity 
reduction in the Gulf of Mexico’s offshore shrimp fishery, including the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ).  I then simulate an alternative policy path using a OTB program 
to buyback licenses in order to compare the results of these two auction forms. 
 Finally, concluding remarks will appear in Chapter VI.  In this chapter I will 
provide a summary of important results and discuss some directions for future research 
in the area of license buyback programs. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF AUCTIONS 
 
Introduction 
 The Texas Inshore Shrimp License Buyback Program is structured as a first-
price, sealed-bid auction, which has been conducted at least once a year since its 
inception in 1996.  In order to appreciate the contributions of the particular econometric 
model developed in Chapter IV it is important to understand how economists have 
traditionally approached auction data. 
 The subject of auctions has a rich history in the economics literature.  In 
particular, because they can serve as a price discovery mechanism for goods which lack 
other well-defined markets, auctions are especially important in resource and 
environmental economics, where non-market valuation plays a critical role.  Though 
there are many auction issues relevant to the field of resource economics in general, I 
focus this literature review on a particular topic germane to our principal objectives: the 
theoretical foundations of optimal bidding.  
I begin by presenting some standard results for simple auction forms then expand 
our review to include results from more complicated auction forms.  The remainder of 
this chapter will be organized as follows: first I present the derivation of optimal bidding 
functions for a benchmark auction.  Next, I review some generalizations of those results 
which apply more closely to our license buyback auction.  Then I move away from game 
theory-based models and discuss learning in sequential auctions.  Finally, I discuss some 
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literature on dynamic specifications for sequential competitive bidding and relate this 
literature to our model. 
Benchmark Auction 
As with many empirical studies using auction data, our challenge is to use 
observed data on bids to get some information on license holder’s private values.  
Traditional empirical work has relied heavily on auction theory to provide a closed form 
expression for optimal bidding strategies.  These bidding functions relate observed bids 
to unobserved values and, it is through these functions, that researchers have typically 
derived information about private valuations.  Although there are a number of thorough 
surveys on optimal bidding in the literature (Milgrom and Weber 1982; Milgrom 1985; 
Wilson 1987; Milgrom 1989), in the following section I will focus on the presentation of 
McAfee and McMillian (1987). 
McAfee and McMillan show that a Nash Equilibrium for a first-price, sealed-bid 
auction can be found by maximizing the expected payoffs of an arbitrary bidder.  In this 
section I present the technical details of this approach as they are important for 
understanding theoretically consistent bidding functions in general.  I will also show that 
this approach generalizes to the bidding functions for auctions which may violate one or 
more of the four assumptions presented below.  The simplest case is what the authors 
refer to as the benchmark model.  The benchmark model imposes the following four 
assumptions: 
 8
1. The bidders are risk neutral. 
2. The independent-private-values assumption applies.  This means that each bidder 
has his own value for the object and that this value is independent of other 
bidders’ values.   
3. The bidders are symmetric.  This assumption requires that all private values come 
from a single distribution. 
4. Payment is a function of bids alone.  A common violation of this assumption is 
the case where royalties are required of the winning bidder. 
 
Given these assumptions one can consider bidder i , who has valuation iv and believes all 
other bidders will bid according to a function  .  He must choose his bid ib in order to 
maximize his expected payoff.  Bidder si' expected payoff is the product of the 
probability that he wins the auction with bid ib and his payoff if he wins.  This is 
expressed compactly as: 
 )()( iiii vFbv   (2.1) 
Here F(v) denotes the distribution of private values and ii bv )( , which implies that 
.)(1 ii vb    Using this notation, (2.1) can be rewritten as: 
 11 )](()[(  niiii bFbv   (2.2) 
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In the equation above, n represent the number of bidders.  Each bidder chooses his bid to 
maximize expected payoff, so he chooses ib to satisfy the first order condition that 
.0

i
i
b
   Next one takes the total differential of i  with respect to iv : 
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
vdv
db
bvdv
d



   
By differentiating (2.1) one can see that the condition for an optimally chosen bid is: 
 11 ))](([ 
 ni
i
i
i
i bF
vdv
d   (2.3) 
 
Since only bidder i  has been considered up to this point, (2.2) is a best response function 
for any decision rule B that i ’s rivals may use.  In equilibrium all bidders should be 
playing their best response strategy.  If the Nash condition that the rivals’ use of B must 
be consistent with rationality is imposed and the assumption of symmetry is invoked, 
then bidder si' optimal bid must be the bid implied by the decision rule B.  This means 
that Nash Equilibrium implies that ).( ii vb    One can substitute this condition into 
equation (2.2) to get an expression for bidder s'i expected payoff in equilibrium: 
 1)]([  ni
i
i vF
dv
d  (2.4) 
McAfee and McMillan show that 2.3 can be solved by integration, imposing the endpoint 
condition that ll vv )( .  This condition states that the bidder with the lowest possible 
valuation earns no profits.  The authors show that the solution to the differential equation 
in (2.3) is given by: 
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 ni
vF
dF
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v
v
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ii
i
l ,...,2,1
)]([
)]([
)( 1
1
 
 
  (2.5) 
This function gives each individual’s bidding rule in equilibrium.  The equilibrium is 
symmetric in that all bidders have the same optimal bidding rule, only the private value 
changes.  As an example,1 consider a special case where F is uniformly distributed and 
the lowest possible valuation is 0.  The optimal bidding strategy noted in (2.4) implies 
that bidder with valuation v submits a bid of .)1()(
n
vnvB    In this special case, each 
bidder shades his bid by the constant .)1(
n
n     
 Empirical studies using auction data have relied on bidding functions derived 
from game theory-based models, like the model of McAfee and McMillan presented 
above.  This model has several restrictive assumptions which probably cannot 
realistically be thought to hold for many auctions in practice.  In the next section I review 
the presentation by Krishna (2002) for a model in which one of these assumptions, 
namely that of bidder symmetry, is violated.  
Bidder Symmetry 
In the shrimp license buyback auction, which I model in this dissertation, the 
assumption of a single distribution for private values seems quite unrealistic.  According 
to experts on this particular fishery there is substantial incidence of latent effort.  Having 
a number of license holders who do not fish but who are eligible to participate in the 
                                                 
1 It should be reiterated that this example is given in McAfee and McMillan (1987). 
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auction, it would seem more plausible to model the private values as coming from two 
separate distributions.  At least it makes intuitive sense that one should think about 
license holders active in the fishery as having private values which differ systematically 
from those license holders who are not active.  Allowing for asymmetric bidders presents 
problems for the derivation of equilibrium strategies. Krishna (2002) shows that an 
analytical solution to the system of differential equations characterizing the equilibrium 
bidding strategies in the case of asymmetric bidders can be found only in a few special 
cases.  In general, the solution must be found using numerical methods for specific 
distributions.  This certainly complicates the recovery of the distribution of private 
values, but does not make it impossible.  In fact, Perrigne and Vuong (1996) discuss a 
method for structural estimation of an asymmetric, first-price auction within the 
independent private-values assumption, which does not rely on explicit calculation of the 
optimal bidding function.    
In this section I have discussed some important results regarding bidder 
asymmetries in an attempt to understand how relaxing the assumptions of McAfee and 
McMillan’s benchmark model affect the derivation of the optimal bidding function.  An 
important lesson from this discussion is that as we begin to relax the assumptions of the 
baseline model, clean closed-form solutions for optimal bidding rules become extremely 
difficult and often times impossible to derive.  In the next section I take another step 
toward the true auction model for our process and begin our discussion of sequential 
auctions. 
 12
Sequential Auctions 
 So far I have discussed bidding strategies only in the context of single-shot 
auctions.  However, one of the most interesting features of the shrimp license buyback 
auction is its repeated nature.  The auction takes place at least once, and in some cases, 
multiple times per year.  One might conjecture that this sequential auction format would 
encourage speculation as license holders know, if they bid too high, they will get another 
chance to sell next period.  We have seen that, in single-shot auctions, bidders chose a 
bidding strategy which is a best response to the strategy of rival bidders.  Here the 
strategic element is bidder against bidder.  When auctions are sequential in nature one 
must consider an additional strategic element of bidders against time.  In this section I 
review literature on sequential auction theory and learning in auctions and the dynamics 
of competitive bidding in order to help us deal with these additional complications. 
Although there are a number of important empirical studies on sequential 
auctions in the literature (Ashenfelter 1989; Neugebauer and Pezanis-Christou 2007; 
Ginsberg and van Ours 2007), this review will be confined to the theory of optimal 
bidding.  An excellent overview of bidding functions for sequential auctions can be 
found in Krishna (2002).  An approach similar to that used by McAfee and McMillan to 
derive equilibrium bidding strategies for a single round auction is applied by Krishna to 
sequential auctions.  I present Krishna’s derivation here in detail primarily because it will 
help illustrate some of the limitations of traditional game theory-based models.  For our 
analysis it is important to understand why these models fail to explain observed bidding 
behavior.  
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For simplicity, consider first a sequential auction with two objects.  Assume that 
each bidder has single unit demand and that bidders’ private values are random draws 
from a single distribution, F.  This symmetry among bidders leads to a symmetric 
equilibrium.  In the second period, the payoff to an arbitrary bidder (call him bidder 1) 
from bidding an amount z is: 
 )],()[();,( 12112 yzxyYzFyxz     (2.6) 
In this case 1Y defines the highest of the n-1 values, 2Y the second highest, and so on.  
2F is the distribution of 2Y and 1y is the winning bid of the first period.  2 is the bid 
function for the second period and x is a private value.  The first order condition for 
optimal bidding requires that the derivative of (2.6), with respect to z, equal 0 for all x.  
 0),(')()],()[( 1211212112  yxyYxFyxxyYxf   (2.7) 
 )],([
)(
)(
),(' 12
112
112
12 yxxyYxF
yYxf
yx  
  (2.8) 
We also have the endpoint condition that .0),0( 12 y   This condition says that a bidder 
with a private value of 0 for the object will bid 0.  The probability that bidder 1 wins the 
second auction is the probability that the second highest order statistic, 2Y  is less than 
bidder 1’s bid (z) conditional on the fact that 11 yY  .  This last equality says that the first 
order statistic ( 1Y , the highest of the N-1 values) is no longer bidding in the second 
period because it won the auction in the first period.  Since the values are drawn 
independently, this probability is equal to the probability that 21
NY (the highest of the 
remaining N-2 values) is less than z, given that 21
NY is less than the winning bid from 
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the first round.  These properties will help us simplify the differential equation in 2.8.  
Given the information above one can express the probability that bidder 1 wins the 
auction in the second round as: 
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Using (2.9) in (2.8), Krishna expresses the differential equation in (2.8) as: 
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This can be equivalently expressed as: 
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The solution to this differential equation is also provided by Krishna and characterizes 
equilibrium bidding in the second round: 
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Working backwards, the first period analysis begins by considering what happens if 
bidder 1 does not bid according the equilibrium strategy, )(1 x but instead bids )(1 z .  In 
the case that xz  , bidders 1’s payoff is: 
 )]([)())(1)(1()]()[(),( 2
2
11 xxxFxFNxxzFxz
N     (2.13) 
In the case that z < x, then the payoff is: 
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For (2.7) we have the following first order condition: 
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The first order condition for equation 2.7 is: 
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In equilibrium it is optimal to bid )(1 x , so setting z = x in either first order condition 
gives: 
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Krishna shows that, by invoking the boundary condition that 0)0(1  , one can 
rearrange (2.11), expressing it as: 
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which has the following solution: 
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These results are summarized as Krishna’s Proposition 15.12:  
 
Suppose bidders have single-unit demand and two units are 
sold by means of sequential first-price auctions.  
Symmetric equilibrium strategies are 
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 The two-unit sequential auction case can be generalized to a case where K units  
                                                 
2 Krishna (2002, pg. 214). 
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are sold in sequential, first-price auctions.  By following essentially the same procedure 
of maximizing expected payoffs, Krishna shows that the equilibrium bidding rule in any 
period, k, is given by: 
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An explicit solution to (2.17) can be derived by working backwards and is expressed in a 
generalization of proposition 15.1.  Proposition 15.23 states:   
 
Suppose bidders have single-unit demand and K units are 
sold by means of sequential first-price auctions.  
Symmetric equilibrium strategies are given by 
][)( 1 kkIk YxYEx  
 
where )(xIk denotes the bidding strategy in the kth 
auction and )1(  Nkk YY is the kth highest of N-1 
independently drawn values. 
  
Krishna shows that the same approach used earlier to derive an expression for the 
equilibrium bidding strategy for a simple auction (what was referred to as the benchmark 
model by McAfee and McMillan) can also be used to derive closed form representations 
for optimal bidding strategies in a much more complicated auction.  
 These results concerning bidding strategies presented here are significant 
because the game theoretic foundations of auction theory rely on attributing 
characteristics of auctions, such as observed prices, to strategic behavior.  Once we 
                                                 
3 From Krishna (2002, p.215) 
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derive a bidder’s best response function to an arbitrary strategy that he supposes his 
rival(s) to be using, the Nash condition is exploited to yield each bidder’s equilibrium 
bidding function.  This traditional approach would suggest that our problem of modeling 
the shrimp license buyback program is simply a problem of choosing the correct auction 
model, obtaining an expression either analytically or numerically for optimal bidding 
strategies, then applying one of the empirical techniques survey by Perrigne and Vuong 
(1999) to back out a set of private valuations.   
Learning in Sequential Auctions 
The game theory-based models presented earlier largely ignore the component of 
information transmission over time.  We see this quite clearly in Krishna’s proposition 
15.2 which states that equilibrium strategies for a given round of a sequential auction are 
independent of realizations of price in previous bidding rounds.  Although it seems quite 
intuitive that bidder’s should use information from prior rounds when submitting bids in 
a sequential auction, I could find very little in the auction literature attempting to 
incorporate learning.   
Jeitschko (1998) presents a model where bidders update a subjective probability 
regarding the valuation type of their opponents in a sequential auction.  His model is a 
sealed bid, first-price auction with three players and two rounds.  Each player can be one 
of two types: a high type or a low type.  A high type bidder has high value for the object 
being auctioned and a low type bidder has a low value for the object.  He also assumes 
that players have unit demand.  Learning is introduced in his model because each bidder 
has a belief about the type of the other bidders.  After observing the outcome of the first 
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auction, the remaining players revise their beliefs about their opponent’s type.  Jeitschko 
shows that the information generated by the sequential auction format has a positive 
value to bidders.  He contrasts the equilibrium strategies resulting from a model allowing 
learning with the equilibrium implied by a myopic model and finds that bidders who are 
allowed to react to information place lower bids, on average, and have higher payoffs.  
This result is important for our study in that it suggests, quite strongly, that the true 
model for sequential auction data should include information transmission over time.   
Recently, the heavy reliance on strategic behavior to explain bidding has been 
challenged in the experimental literature, most notably by Ginsberg (1998) and Deltas 
and Kosmopoulou (2004).  Among the most troubling results is Krishna’s derivation of 
optimal bidding functions in sequential auctions, which show that the bids in any round 
of the auction should be independent of prices in previous rounds.  The trends in our data 
clearly indicate the presence of a speculative component which seems to be due to the 
dynamic nature of the problem.  In the early rounds of the auction we observe very high 
bids which seem to be distributed quite randomly.  As the auction progresses we see bids 
tending to cluster very tightly around the average buyback price.  In the second round of 
the auction there are a large number of very high bids but by the twelfth round bids are 
clustered very tightly around what these license holders think the agency will accept.  
These data suggest that there is a pronounced learning component in this auction and 
some type of probability updating may help explain bidding behavior.  Our challenge 
then is to find a model flexible enough to allow us to analyze the speculative premium 
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induced by the sequential nature of the auction while retaining some consistency with 
theory. 
 In Chapter IV I will contend that the problem of an individual license holder in 
this auction can be visualized as a dynamic optimization problem where the fisherman 
balances current expected payoff (which is reflected by the bid amount) and the 
discounted future payoff from keeping the license for another period.  This approach is 
not entirely new.  Oren and Rothkopf (1975) showed that dynamic programming can be 
used to derive optimal bidding strategies when a bidder’s strategy in one auction affects 
his rivals’ strategies in subsequent auctions.   
The authors use the bidder’s strategy as the control in their model and use the 
collective behavior of the bidder’s rivals as the state variable.  The state equation in their 
model represents the rival’s reaction to the bidder’s strategy.  My model is similar in that 
I am modeling the bidding problem as a dynamic, multistage process where the bid in a 
given period is the control.  However, I consider the state variables to be parameters of a 
distribution reflecting the bidder’s subjective probability that a bid will be accepted.  As 
he places bids and observes the outcome (either agency accepts his bid or rejects it) he 
revises this subjective probability.  Our state equation is one which describes how the 
parameters of the distribution change as the bidder receives information over time.        
Summary 
 The economic literature has a long history of using a game-theory based approach 
to derive the functions defining optimal bidding in an auction.  While this approach has 
been effective in addressing certain questions of traditional interest (for example, many 
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of the works cited in this chapter have as a principal objective the comparison of revenue 
properties across different types of auctions), it seems to lack the flexibility to shed light 
on our principal question of interest: does the sequential auction induce a speculative 
premium.   
 Although the model I present in Chapter IV represents a departure from the main 
approaches surveyed in this literature review, the importance of this chapter should not 
be underestimated.  In fact our departure from more traditional modeling methods 
illustrates one important contribution of our work: namely, the estimation of a dynamic 
optimization based model for optimal bidding in a sequential auction which does not rely 
on the assumption of truthful revelation.   
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CHAPTER III 
LESSONS FROM THE TEXAS INSHORE SHRIMP FISHERY 
Introduction 
The ability of buyback programs to successfully promote efficiency has been 
questioned extensively in the economic literature (Larkin, Keithly, Adams, and 
Kazmierczak 2004; Mullin 2001; Weninger and McConnell 2000).  However, despite 
economists’ concerns, buyback programs continue to find favor with fisheries managers 
who often must balance biological, economic, and social goals.    
In Chapter I I refer to 3 criteria which fishery managers must frequently consider 
when making policy: biological conservation, economic efficiency, and welfare.  
Because buyback programs may be designed to address all three of these goals, they have 
traditionally found favor with fisheries managers.  If buyback programs are able to 
address biological, economic, and social goals within a single policy, then they will 
likely continue to be implemented as budgets permit. 
Given the past popularity and likely continued implementation of buybacks in 
fisheries management, it is important to understand how these programs affect fisheries 
and how individuals respond to the incentive structures created by them.  In this chapter I 
use the Texas Inshore Shrimp License Buyback Program as a backdrop for understanding 
the effects of buybacks on demographics and fleet characteristics of the fishery, as well 
as understanding how individuals behave under a buyback management regime.    
I present data on fleet size and composition, bidder characteristics, and bidding 
behavior in order to completely describe this program.  Fleet statistics speak to the effect 
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that the program has had on the shrimp fleet in the Texas bays.  Individual characteristics 
shed light on the state of the bidders in the fishery and, finally, individual behaviors 
illustrate how agents respond to the sequential auction format.     
The goals for this chapter are two-fold.  First, I aim to provide an understanding 
of how buyback programs affect the nature of the fisheries they govern by presenting 
trends in Texas Inshore Shrimp Fishery data.  I also hope to provide a clear picture of 
how individual agents respond to the incentive structure provided by sequential buyback 
auctions in order to help fisheries managers understand the implications of this type of 
program.   
Literature 
 Our data analysis makes an important contribution to two existing bodies of 
literature.  The first is a general discussion on the role of buyback programs in fisheries 
management and the second is a well-know sequential auction phenomenon, the 
declining price anomaly.  Here I discuss briefly how our study contributes to these two 
areas of research. 
 The recent popularity of buyback schemes as a fisheries management tool has 
produced a large and growing body of literature on the effects of buyback programs on 
overcapitalized fisheries.  Holland et al. (1999) provide an extensive review buyback 
programs throughout the world.  They present evidence from a number of programs in 
order to make some general conclusions regarding the ability of buyback programs to 
conserve stocks, rationalize the fleet and provide income redistribution.  Grooves and 
Squires (2007) follow up on this work and present a thorough overview of general 
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reasons for and consequences of buyback programs.  Our study fits within this body of 
literature by providing an in-depth account of the impact of a particular buyback type 
(the sequential license buyback program) on the Texas inshore shrimp fishery. 
The Declining Price Anomaly 
The general subject of auctions is a well explored topic in the economic literature 
with a variety of sub-topics.  One of these subtopics is the declining price anomaly, a 
phenomenon observed in many sequential auctions.  Since the Texas Shrimp License 
Buyback Program provides a set of data generated by a sequential auction, these 
observations provide some empirical evidence relevant to the discussion of the declining 
price anomaly.   
This auction mechanism provides many opportunities for fishermen to behave 
strategically.  Each round of bidding gives participants new information about the 
probability that a particular bid will be granted.  The sequential nature of the auction 
allows bidders to use information from previous rounds in forming bids for the next 
round.  The focus of the next chapter in this dissertation will be modeling how bidders 
use this information. 
It has been noted that, in sequential auctions, identical items tend to sell for less 
in later rounds than in earlier ones.  This phenomenon has been termed the “declining 
price anomaly” and several empirical studies in the economic literature have confirmed 
its existence (Ashenfelter 1989; McAfee and Vincent 1993; van den Berg, van Ours, and 
Pradhan 2001).  A clear and concise summary of relevant auction theory is provided by 
van den Berg et. al (2001): 
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Somewhat loosely, one may state than an English auction is truth-
revealing whereas a Dutch auction requires strategic behavior.  The 
simple structure of the one-unit English auction vanishes if two identical 
objects are auctioned sequentially.  Now, in the first round it is optimal 
for bidders to shade their bids to account for the option value of 
participating in the subsequent second round (Robert J. Weber, 1983).  
Bidders with a higher valuation also have a higher option value.  
Therefore, they shade their bids in the first round by a greater amount than 
do bidders with a lower valuation.  As the auction proceeds, the number 
of bidders decreases.  Over the sequence of auctions, the number of 
objects decreases as well.  The first fact has a negative effect on the 
competition for an object and second has a positive effect.  Both effects 
cancel out and prices follow a martingale.  As a result, all gains to waiting 
are arbitraged away and the expected prices in both rounds are the same.  
The latter result also holds for sequential auctions of more than two 
objects and does not depend on whether the auction is English or Dutch. 
This neat theoretical result is not supported by empirical research, which 
usually finds price declines.    
 
While our data includes bidders who are sellers not buyers, their behavior can 
still be interpreted in the context of the declining bid anomaly.  Bidders who are buyers 
decrease their probability of success as they adjust their bids downwards and for bidders 
who are selling it is the opposite.  In examining the data from the buyback program, I 
will show that participants tend to bid high (decreasing their probability of success early 
on) in early rounds and, as the auction progresses and they learn about the agency’s 
values, bids decline (increasing their probability of success later).  This pattern runs 
contrary to empirical evidence from traditional auctions which finds that buyers’ bids 
tend to be high early on and decline as the auction progresses.  
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A Background on the Texas Shrimp License Buyback 
Biology4 
 The lifecycle of the Gulf of Mexico panaeid (brown, pink, and white shrimp) is 
approximately one year.  Mature shrimp spawn in the gulf and their eggs are carried into 
freshwater estuaries by the tides.  Juvenile shrimp migrate from the estuaries into the 
bays the, eventually, the offshore gulf where the cycle continues.   
History 
The shrimp fishery has traditionally been the largest and most valuable fishery in 
the state.  Prior to the license buyback program Texas had historically managed its 
shrimp fishery through closures.  This allowed shrimp to reach a larger size before 
harvest and larger shrimp fetch high prices.  However, between 1970 and the start of the 
buyback program in 1995 there was a severe increase in effort in the Texas bays.  This 
effort increase led to a shortage of large shrimp for inshore as well as offshore gulf 
shrimpers (Robinson, Cambell, and Butler 1994).  To counteract the income effects of 
harvesting smaller shrimp, fishermen resorted in increasing effort in an attempt to land 
more total pounds. 
The shrimp license buyback program, administered by the Texas Parks and 
Wildlife Department (TPWD), was adopted in 1995 to address the sharp decline in 
                                                 
4 Biological information is taken from Texas Parks and Wildlife Department (2002).  Readers interested in 
a more detailed discussion of the lifecycle for Gulf of Mexico shrimp should consult this report. 
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profitability of the shrimp fishing industry5.  TPWD began retiring licenses in 1996.  
Partial funding for the license buybacks was created through a $3 increase in the cost of 
the saltwater fishing stamp.  The overriding goal of this program was to reduce 
overcapitalization without imposing severe economic damages on coastal communities 
(TPWD 2002). 
Licenses 
In Texas, each shrimp boat can hold up to three licenses; a bay license, bait 
license and gulf license.  Only bay and bait licenses are eligible for buyback; gulf 
licenses are not.  Each of these three licenses confers on its owner a different set of 
rights.   
Bay and bait licenses allow the holder to shrimp only in the bays and estuaries 
whereas a gulf license permits the holder to fish in the offshore areas.  Additionally, a 
federal permit is required to shrimp beyond 9 nautical miles out to 200 nautical miles.  A 
bait license allows its holder to fish major bays and bait bays year round but imposes a 
200 pound bag limit.  Additionally, from November 15th to August 15th at least half the 
catch must be kept in live condition.  A bay license allows its holder to fish major bays 
during the spring open season, from May 15th to July 15th, and the fall open season, from 
August 15th to November 30th.  Bay license holders may also fish major bays south of the 
Colorado River during the winter open season from February 1st to April 15th.  There are 
                                                 
5 Funk, Griffin, Mjelde and Ward (2003) provide a good discussion of the legislation enacting the program 
and the funding structure. 
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no bag limits imposed during the winter or fall open seasons while the spring open 
season has a 600 pound bag limit6. 
Auction Rules 
In order to understand the trends observed in this auction, it is important to 
understand the basic rule structure of the program.  The auction itself is a reverse 
sequential auction with nonbinding bids.  In the following discussion, I provide an 
explanation of the auction mechanism. 
The Texas Inshore Shrimp License Buyback Program purchases bay and bait 
shrimp licenses via a sequential auction.  At the start of each bidding round, license 
holders may state a price at which they are willing to sell their license.  TPWD then 
scores these bids  based primarily on the length of the vessel being bid on7.  After scoring 
the bids, TPWD makes formal offers to buy as many of the top scored bids as their 
budget for that round allows.  At that point, the license holder has an opportunity to 
withdraw his or her bid and keep the licenses or sell the licenses for the bid price.  For 
this reason, we must distinguish between a bid that is accepted by TPWD and a bid that 
is accepted by the fisherman.  In the language of this program a bid is “granted” if it is 
accepted by TPWD and a bid is said to be “accepted” if the offer from TPWD is accepted 
by the fisherman.  In order for a license to be bought back it must be granted and 
accepted.  Once a license is bought back, it is retired from the fishery. 
                                                 
6 For a complete description of the rights associated with each type of shrimp license see TPWD 2005. 
7 We do not have the exact format that TPWD uses to score bids.  Through personal communication with 
Robin Reichers we know that vessel length is the most important component of the bid score. 
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The Decision Making Environment 
The introduction of the sequential buyback program created a rich decision 
environment for shrimp license holders.  In order to understand the many interesting 
effects of this program on the fishery and fishermen’s interaction with it, it is important 
to understand the choices available to bidders in the auction. 
Beginning in 1996 license holders could decide to use or sell either of two 
licenses.  Licenses were also made transferable so, in addition to deciding whether to sell 
a boat’s license back to TPWD or use it to fish, each owner had a third option: sell the 
license to another fisherman.  We can view each owner as managing a portfolio of assets 
consisting of vessels and licenses, which define the rights of those vessels.  In each round 
of the auction the owner has the option of altering his or her portfolio by selling assets.  
From Figure 3.1 one can see the options available to a single license holder in the 
fishery.  In each period a license holder must decide whether to try and sell the license in 
that period.  There are two possible markets for sales: the transfer market and the 
buyback market.  In the decision tree above, both of these decisions end in the owner 
exiting the fishery.  However, since the program retires only the licenses, sale of one 
license does not preclude the fisherman from participating in other fisheries for which he 
or she still owns a license or using the vessel in some other way.  If a fisherman decides 
not to attempt a sale, he or she can lease the license in that period or use it.  These actions 
end with the designation B.  This is meant to convey that if the fisherman follows the Not 
Sell portion of the decision tree he or she will end up in a state next period where all the 
original options are available.   
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Figure 3.1. Single License Decision Tree 
  
The decisions involved in holding a single license are complex, but few 
fishermen in this fishery owned a single license at the start of this program.  Most license 
holders in our data set held both a bay and bait license.  For shrimpers holding bay and 
bait licenses on their boats the options available in each period expand greatly.  Those 
license holders owning both bay and bait licenses for a single boat can decide, not only 
whether to sell a license, but also how many and which license(s) to sell..  
To avoid over complication I don’t develop the possibility of adding a gulf 
license to the asset mix, which adds further important complications.  However, the 
reader should realize that, in addition to a bay and bait license for a vessel, an owner may 
hold a gulf license for that same vessel.  In addition to the complexity added by the gulf 
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license, some owners posses multiple vessels.  This expands the number of possible 
actions in the license holder’s portfolio management problem even further.   
Re-entry 
Once a license is purchased it is retired but, because licenses are transferable, it is 
possible for a license holder to re-enter the fishery after selling a license.  However, this 
would require buying a license from a current license holder.  So, while re-entry is 
possible, the moratorium placed on new shrimp licenses in 1995 guarantees that in order 
for someone to enter, or re-enter, the fishery someone else must exit. 
This auction mechanism allows for a wide range of choices among bidders and 
leaves open much potential for strategizing.  In the sections that follow, one will explore 
the bidding patterns observed under this sequential auction.  First, one briefly discuss the 
data relevant for this analysis.  
Data 
For this study I use data provided by TPWD.  The data come from multiple 
different files and, because there are some slight differences, it is important to explain 
each. 
First, the bidding rounds file contains a round-by-round record of every bid 
submitted in the auction.  This source reports the vessel and license being bid on, the 
amount of the bid, whether TPWD granted the bid and, if the bid was granted, whether 
the individual accepted that bid.    
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In order to incorporate demographic variables that may affect the license holder’s 
bidding function I use the license holder database.  This data set contains records for all 
license holders in the fishery from 1997 – 2004.  This file gives us vessel lengths, dates 
of birth, and home ports for all license holders in the fishery.  This demographic and 
vessel characteristic data is important in helping us determine factors influencing bidding 
behavior.   
   In many cases, auction data is only available for individuals who submitted 
winning bids.  An advantage of this data over traditional auction generated data sets is 
that it contains information on all license holders, regardless of whether or not they chose 
to bid.  Therefore, in addition to observing factors affecting the size of a participant’s 
bid, I also observe factors affecting the decision to place a bid. 
At this point it is worth emphasizing that, while the first round of bidding was 
carried out in 1996, the data only contain demographic information for license holders 
beginning in 1997.  So while I can report on auction statistics (number of licenses 
purchased, amount spent, and average license price) for all 14 rounds, statistics such as 
average length for vessels in the fleet or average age for all license holders can be 
calculated only for rounds 2 – 14.     
In addition to the auction and license holder data sets I also have data from 
TPWD on vessel upgrades.  Anytime a license holder alters a vessel it is recorded as a 
vessel upgrade.  The reader should understand that vessel upgrades include purchasing a 
new boat or altering the length and/or horsepower of the current one.   TPWD currently 
has in place a restriction on the percentage by which fisherman can increase the length or 
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horsepower of their vessel.  This restriction is in place to prevent capital stuffing8 or 
effort creep that may occur with a buyback program.   
Finally, I have economic data specific to the Texas bay system provided by 
TPWD.  This includes landings, ex-vessel values, and prices for shrimp from 1972 – 
2002. 
Licenses in the Fishery in 1997 
The first year in which I have data for all license holders in the fishery is 1997.  I 
use this year as a baseline, from which changes are measured.  Here I offer a picture of 
the inshore shrimp fishery at the beginning of the buyback auction as a basis for future 
comparisons.   
  At the start of our data in 1997 there were 2,948 shrimp licenses eligible for 
buyback.  Almost all of these licenses were held by individuals, not companies or 
corporations.  Of the licenses eligible for sale at the start, 817 individual fishermen and 
1,792 unique vessels can be identified.  Of the unique vessel owners in the fishery in 
1997, 33% owned multiple boats and 67% were single vessel owners. 
Among all licenses eligible for buyback, bay and bait licenses were almost 
equally represented.  There were 1,501 bay licenses and 1,447 bait licenses in the fishery 
in 1997.  The vast majority (96%) of vessels in the fleet held both bay and bait licenses 
together.   
                                                 
8 Capital stuffing or effort creep is a well know phenomenon in regulated fisheries.  The reader is referred 
to Townsend (1985) or, for a more specific discussion of capital stuffing in the Texas Inshore Shrimp 
Fishery, the reader may refer to Funk, Griffin, and Mjelde (2003).  
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Although they cannot be sold back, gulf licenses represent a potentially important 
part of our data set.  In 1997 about 30% of the vessel owners in the inshore fishery also 
held a gulf license on at least one of their vessels.  Moreover, about 10% of these owners 
held a gulf license on the same vessel that was licensed to shrimp the bay system. 
In sum, the Texas inshore shrimp fishery is comprised of a large number of small 
owner/operators.  The average vessel length for the fleet in 1997 was about 38 feet.  
About one third of the fishermen owned multiple vessels and this same fraction held a 
gulf shrimp license.  In the next section I will look in detail at the auction’s effects on 
this fishery. 
Buyback Outcomes 
In the previous section I presented a picture of the Texas inshore shrimp fishery 
in 1997.  In the discussion which follows I will examine the effect that the first 14 rounds 
of the buyback auction had on this fishery.  In particular I will provide a summary of 
expenditures and key buyback results. 
Scale of the Buyback Program 
Perhaps one of the most distinguishing aspects of the Texas shrimp license 
buyback program is its size.  Table 3.1 shows a comparison of buyback programs in 
recent U.S history9.  Like many state run buyback programs it is small relative to 
federally funded vessel buyback programs, but the Texas program is small even by state  
                                                 
9 The data in this table come from Muse (1999) as well as from our own data on the Texas inshore shrimp 
fishery provided by TPWD. 
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standards.  From its start in 1996 to the 14th round in 2004 the Texas Inshore Shrimp 
License Buyback Program spent $8.3 million, a modest sum in comparison to other 
programs.  
 
Table 3.1   
Selected U.S Fisheries Buyback Programs 
Fishery Date 
Total Cost 
(million $s) Type 
BSAI Crab Fishery 2004 97.4 Vessel/License
Bering Sea Pollack Fishery 1998 90.2 Vessel/License
NE Groundfish 1995-1998 24.4 Vessel/License
WA Salmon Fishery 1995-1998 13.5 License 
TX Inshore Shrimp Fishery 1996-2004 8.3 License 
  
 
Although the Texas program operates on a financially smaller scale than most 
U.S. buyback programs, the number of licenses sold through the buyback is quite large.  
Table 3.2 shows the licenses retired in each round of the Texas program through the 14th 
round.  From the table below, one can see that TPWD typically buys back between 50 – 
100 licenses per round.  Furthermore, because the agency frequently holds more than one 
bidding round per year, the total number of licenses bought out exceeded 100 in most 
calendar years.  In 1996 and 1997 the agency purchased only 30 and 37 permits 
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respectively.  TPWD purchased at least 100 permits in every year from 1998 to 2004.  
During that time, the fewest number of permits purchased in any year was 105 in 2000.  
This was the fishery’s most financially successful year so it is not surprising to see 
relatively few owners selling back10.  The largest number of licenses purchased in any 
single year was 219 in 2001.  As a point of comparison, Washington State’s Salmon 
License Buyback scheme retired 822 permits while the total number of licenses retired 
by the Texas program is 1,207 and counting. 
Licenses Retired 
Through the 14th round of the Texas buyback 1,207 license had been retired.  
Excluding the 30 licenses which were bought out in the first round, this leaves 1,177 
licenses purchased between 1997 and 2004.  This amounts to a 40% reduction in the 
number of licenses over the relevant time period.  
                                                 
10 Personal communication with Michael Travis, Industry Economist, National Marine Fisheries Service, 
Southeast Regional Office. 
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Table 3.2 
License Purchases by Round for the TX Program11 
Round Year 
Licenses 
Sold High Low 
Avg. 
Purchase 
Price Total Spent 
1 1996 30 $6,000 $220  $3,394  $101,820  
2 1997 41 $6,000 $100  $3,104  $127,227  
3 1998 59 $6,400 $1,500 $3,692  $217,855  
4 1998 53 $6,500 $2,500 $3,553  $188,345  
5 1998 75 $7,000 $2,500 $4,632  $347,400  
6 1999 116 $8,000 $2,500 $5,571  $646,250  
7 2000 105 $8,600 $1,500 $6,273  $658,698  
8 2001 77 $8,000 $2,500 $6,038  $465,000  
9 2001 144 $8,500 $3,000 $6,255  $900,685  
10 2002 122 $8,950 $3,000 $6,632  $809,185  
11 2002 86 $9,500 $2,500 $6,998  $601,896  
12 2003 117 $9,500 $2,300 $7,322  $856,694  
13 2004 77 $9,000 $5,500 $7,464  $574,740  
14 2004 105 $15,000 $4,360 $8,396  $881,670  
Auction 
Totals   1,207       $7,431,465  
 
 
Given this 40% reduction in the number of shrimp permits in the fishery, a 
natural question to follow up with is, has this reduction led to measurable changes in the 
inshore shrimp fishery?  In this section I will examine changes in the biologic and 
economic health of the fishery during limited entry. 
                                                 
11 A similar table appears in Reichers, Griffin, and Woodward (2007).  Our table here includes rounds 13 
and 14 of the auction. 
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Effort 
Effort, measured in days fished12, dropped about 70% for the Texas inshore 
shrimp fishery from 1995 - 200413.  In addition, TPWD fly-over counts14 taken in 1995 
and 2004 show a 67% decline in number of vessels on the water on opening day.  In 
1995, 886 vessels were counted on the water on opening day.  By 2004 only 293 vessels 
were counted on opening day.  It should be noted that this decline is greater than the drop 
in licenses attributable to the buyback program, suggesting that some fishermen may be 
holding on to their license in order to sell it back, while using it less frequently.  
CPUE 
Catch per unit of effort (CPUE) is an important indicator of fleet efficiency.  
From Figure 3.2 one see that CPUE in the Texas bay system stayed approximately 
constant from 1995 to about 2002 and increased precipitously in 2003 and 2004.  The 
difference from 1995 to 2004 was about 233 pounds per unit effort, which amounts to an 
increase of about 40% in CPUE.  And during this time, total licenses in the fishery fell 
by 34%. 
                                                 
12 One day fished is equal to 24 hours of continuous trawl time.   
13 This figure is calculated from effort estimated by Griffin.  Effort estimates from NMFS show a similar 
pattern of decline. 
14 On August 15th (Opening day of the fall open season) TPWD performs aerial counts of actual number of 
vessels in each major bay.  It should also be noted that the aerial counts performed on the first day of 
spring open season, May 15th, reveal a similar pattern. 
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Figure 3.2. Catch per Unit Effort (CPUE) for the TX Inshore Shrimp Fishery 1995 - 
2004 
 
Landing and Ex-vessel Values 
While the recent rise in CPUE suggests that the inshore shrimping fleet is 
harvesting with greater efficiency, the trends in shrimp landing and ex-vessel values 
paint a much gloomier picture.  From data kept by TPWD for the Texas bay system I 
calculate that, in 2004, landings for pink and brown shrimp from the Texas bays were 
down 77% from the ten year average from 1985-1995.  Additionally, ex-vessel values for 
pink and brown shrimp were down 86% from the average of the ten year period 
preceding limited entry.  Table 3.3 provides an illustration of changes in key indicators 
during limited entry. 
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Table 3.3  
Key Indicators of the Health of the TX Inshore Shrimp Fishery 
 Ex-Vessel 
Value 
Ex-Vessel 
Price Landings
Fly-Over 
Vessel Count CPUE 
Baseline15 12,424.21 3.13 5,221.63 886 0.55 
2004 5,336.20 3.03 3,307.80 293 0.80 
% Change -57 -3 -37 -67 +45 
 
Prices 
The pricing trends for Texas shrimp have been a complicating factor for analysis 
of the buyback program.  Examining data specific to the Texas bay system, one can see 
the same effect.  In the five year period preceding 2002 the average price for brown and 
pink shrimp from the Texas bays was $1.82 per pound.  In the three year period from 
2002-2004 the average price was $1.08 per pound, a 40% decline.  The price for white 
shrimp from the Texas bay system experienced a 28% drop in price during this period 
(again comparing the average price for the five years preceding 2002 with the 2002 – 
2004 average). 
This price break coincided with a European Union ban on Thai shrimp which, 
along with several other factors16, resulted in a significant increase in U.S shrimp imports 
(NMFS 2004).  Exogenous factors affecting shrimp prices, such as increased imports, 
                                                 
15 The baseline for comparison for Ex-Vessel Value, Landings, and Ex-Vessel Price is a ten year average 
for the period before limited entry (1985-1995).  The baseline for Fly-Over Count and CPUE is 1995. 
16 A thorough discussion of the factors affecting returns to shrimping in Texas can be found in Haby, 
Miget, Falconer, and Graham (2002). 
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make it difficult to assess the buyback programs’ effects on the economics of the inshore 
shrimp fishery in Texas. 
Capital Stuffing 
A major critique of buyback programs is that they will tend to induce capital 
stuffing.  By removing effort from the fishery and pushing up the output price, those 
owners who stay in will have an incentive to expand their operations.  Considering the 
economic state of the fishery discussed previously it is probably not surprising that there 
is little evidence to suggest that capital stuffing has been a problem. 
In addition to license holder demographics and bidding behavior, I have data on 
the number of vessel upgrades.  Through 2004, TPWD processed 250 vessel upgrades.  
Among these, 149 were upgrades to a larger vessel and, while boat length is not a perfect 
indicator for capacity, this is the best proxy currently available.  The 149 vessel upgrades 
that involved a size increase account for roughly 8% of the vessels in the fleet in 1997.  
The average size increase of these upgrades was 3.6 feet.  So, while we do see a small 
percentage of owners expanding operations, the overall incidence of capital stuffing 
appears small, which comes as no great surprise considering the economic conditions 
prevailing in the fishery.   
Outcome summary 
The statistics presented in this section are meant to illustrate the state of the Texas 
inshore shrimp fishery.  I have provided statistics on key economic and biological 
indicators in order to try and measure the program’s impact on the fishery.  Among the 
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many trends presented here one stands out as particularly salient: real effort17 has 
declined substantially since the imposition of limited entry. 
However, because of the price shock realized in 2002, it is very difficult to 
attribute effort reductions solely to the buyback program.  At most it can be concluded 
that the program is adding another incentive to what was already a very strong case for 
exiting this fishery.  However, since intervention in fisheries typically arises in order to 
address an already bleak situation, the same can easily be said for fleet rationalization in 
general.  In the sections that follow I will move away from the macro discussion and 
focus on several interesting micro issues.  I will analyze the buyback program’s effects 
on age composition in the fishery, vessel characteristics, and explore individual behavior 
in the auction itself.    
Auction Behavior 
In this section I will take an informal look at some important factors influencing 
bidding behavior in the sequential auction.  Unfortunately, practical considerations 
prevent us from incorporating all of these into the formal econometric structure of 
Chapter IV.  Hence, these observations provide strong motivation for extensions to our 
econometric model.   
Because much of the money used to finance the Texas program is generated by 
the state in the form of fees on recreational and commercial fishermen, the funds 
                                                 
17 As noted in Griffin, Shah, and Nance (1997), “A unit of nominal effort is defined as net(s) being pulled 
in the water for a period of 24 hours (known in the industry as a day fished).  Standardized effort is defined 
as adjusted nominal effort based on the relative fishing power (RFP) of each vessel in the Gulf of Mexico 
shrimp fleet relative to a standard vessel.” 
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available in any given year are small.  Due to these financial constraints the program is 
run as a sequential auction.  In each round the agency uses its budget to buy back as 
much capacity as they can afford and, when more money becomes available, they hold 
another round.  This sequential format leads to behavioral complexities and interesting 
dynamic pricing patterns.  In the sections that follow I will explore some of the factors 
influencing observed behavior in the auction and outcomes associated with the repeated 
game set-up.   
Age/Length Effects 
In this section I examine the interaction between two key proxy variables and the 
buyback program.  I use vessel length as a proxy for effort and license-holder age serves 
as a proxy for experience.  Here I present the effects of the buyback on average age and 
vessel length in the inshore shrimping fleet as well as patterns in auction bidding across 
different age and vessel size classes. 
Although it is difficult to determine what effect the buyback program has had on 
productivity in this fishery, its impact on the characteristics of the fishery are clear.  Two 
effects on fleet composition which stand out are the program’s effect on average age of 
the license holders in the fishery and average vessel size in the inshore shrimp fleet.  This 
buyback auction has demonstrated a propensity to buyout older license holders and 
smaller vessels.  
First I look at the age of those shrimpers choosing to exit the fishery by selling 
back licenses.  These figures show that older license holders are tending to sell out of this 
fishery faster than young ones.  At the start of this buyback program, the average age of 
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all license holders in the fishery was 47.  By round 14 this average had increased by only 
2 years to 49.  Calculating the average age for fishermen who sold their licenses in each 
round, we find that the mean age of sellers exceeds the mean age of all license holders in 
every round.  Apparently older fishermen are more likely to get out of the fishery—not 
surprising—but they also find the buyback program to be more attractive than the 
transfer market.  Given the tendency of the buyback to remove older license holder from 
the fishery, it is very possible that many participants are using the buyback to generate 
some savings for retirement.  These results are illustrated in Figure A.1 in Appendix A. 
Next, I examine changes in vessel length for the inshore fleet.  I find that the 
average length of vessels in the inshore fleet has increased steadily as the auction has 
progressed.  This is due in part to the propensity of the TPWD to grant bids for smaller 
boats.   
In all but 4 of the 14 rounds at least 70% of the buyout offers were made to boats 
smaller than the median vessel length for the entire fleet in that round.  Likewise, in 7 of 
the 14 rounds over half of the buyout offers were made to boats in the first quartile of the 
age-vessel length distribution.  The result has been a 5% increase in the average vessel 
length of the fleet since 1995.  Figure A.2 in Appendix A shows the trend in average 
vessel length for the fleet over time. Without a counterfactual scenario it is impossible to 
tell whether such a trend would have occurred in the absence of the buyback program.  
However, by purchasing the smaller vessels, it is safe to say that the program has 
exacerbated this trend. 
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The question that arises naturally then is, “are the trends in age of the owners and 
the length of the vessels two separate trends or a single one?”  This question can be 
answered somewhat informally by examining the age/vessel length distribution for the 
fishery. 
At first glance, vessel lengths seem to be distributed fairly evenly across age 
classes.  In 1997, 56% of vessels below the median length were owned by fisherman 
above the median age.  So about half of the small vessels are owned by old fishermen 
and about half are owned by young fishermen.  Among vessels above the median length, 
45% were owned by fishermen above the median age.  The average vessel length for all 
license holders above the median age in 1997 was 37.2 while the average vessel length 
for license holders below the median age was 40.3.  From these figures it does not appear 
that older fishermen necessarily own smaller boats.  In fact, the correlation between age 
and vessel length for all bidders is very weak (-0.094).  However, as shown in Figure 3.3, 
younger fishermen owned a disproportionate number of the largest vessels.  At the start 
of the program, among vessels in the fourth quartile of the distribution (from 45 – 94 ft), 
60% were owned by fishermen below the median age.  Among the largest 10% of boats 
in the fishery in 1997 (those 50 ft or greater), only 35% were owned by license holders 
above the median age.  So, while most of the vessels in the fishery are distributed fairly 
evenly among age classes, the largest vessels belong almost exclusively to young 
fishermen. 
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Figure 3.3.  Vessel Length Distribution by Age of Owner in 199618 
 
Effects on Bidding 
In Chapter IV I will develop a formal dynamic econometric model to estimate 
parameters of the bidding function that will allow us to identify variables affecting the 
underlying value of the licenses.  In particular, I suspect that vessel length, shrimp price, 
and license holder age will influence the size of the bid submitted to the auction.  In this 
section I propose a simple model to test the hypothesis that these three independent 
variables help explain bids. 
Here I propose a Heckman two-stage estimation model as a first attempt at 
modeling the fisherman’s bidding function.  A two-stage model is appropriate in this 
case because I suspect that there may be significant differences in the underlying license 
                                                 
18 Here we use two age classes and four length classes.  The age classes are defined as fishermen above the 
median age for all license holders (old fishermen) and those below (young fishermen).  The length classes 
are separated by quartiles of the distribution of lengths for all vessels in the fishery in 1997.   
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valuation between those owners who chose to participate in the auction and those who do 
not.  In this auction average bid per foot of boat length19 is higher for bidders older than 
the median age.  However, we also observe that the average age of all fishermen who 
submit bids is higher than the average age for all license holders.  This suggests that 
there may be a sample selection bias.  To solve the problem of discerning the effects of 
our suspected drivers on bidding while also accounting for their effects on the 
participation decision I first estimate the following Probit model for the participation 
decision: 
)()1( 43210 GULFOWNPLENGTHAGEGxBidYNP   20 
In the equation above BidYN is a binary variable indicating whether a fisherman 
submitted a bid for that license or not.  AGE, LENGTH, and P are continuous 
independent variables indicating the age of the license holder, length of the vessel to 
which the license is attached, and shrimp price respectively.  GULFOWN is a binary 
variable indicating whether the vessel is also licensed to shrimp in offshore areas.  The 
function G() is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. 
Our sample includes observations of several thousand licenses over 14 time 
periods (rounds).  There are a total of 38,671 observations in our sample, in 2,676 of 
these the dependent variable takes a value equal to 1.  The results of the Probit regression 
are shown in Table 3.4 below.   
 
                                                 
19 Here we are talking about all bids placed, which does not necessarily mean they were granted. 
20 Here we use the notation of Woolridge 2003. 
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From Table 3.4 one can see that age, length, and price all appear to be significant 
factors in the participation decision, though the overall explanatory power of the 
regression is quite low.  License holder age enters positively, suggesting that older 
license holders are more likely to participate in the auction, while the coefficient on 
vessel length suggests that fishermen owning larger boats are less likely to participate. 
 
Table 3.4   
Probit Regression to Explain Auction Participation 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic 
C -0.59 0.10 -5.796 
LENGTH -0.02 0.00 -21.338 
AGE 0.01 0.00 9.061 
GULFLICOWNER -0.20 0.02 -8.867 
P1 -0.07 0.02 -3.264 
McFadden R-Squared 0.047   
Obs with Dep=0 35,995   
Obs with Dep=1 2,676   
Total Obs 38,671   
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In the second stage I use OLS to estimate coefficients of the bid function.  The OLS 
equation is given in the equation below. 
MILLSGULFOWNPROUNDLENGTHAGEBID 6543210    
The dependent variable here is bid in dollars and independent variables are vessel 
length (LENGTH), bidder age (AGE), bidding round (ROUND), and shrimp price lagged 
one period (P1).  In addition, I also include the inverse mills ratio (MILLS)21 from the 
first stage regression as a sample selection correction.  The results of this regression are 
displayed in Table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.5 
OLS Estimation of Fisherman’s Bidding Function22 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic probability  
C 4589.76 3156.83 1.45 0.146
LENGTH 107.97 52.652 2.05 0.040
AGE 60.21 17.38 3.46 0.001
ROUND -533.08 48.47 -10.99 0.000
P1 -1877.8 416.08 -4.51 0.000
MILLS 4772.22 2180.25 2.19 0.028
Adjusted R-
Squared 0.059    
Observations 2,676    
 
 
                                                 
21 The inverse Mills ratio is the ratio between the standard normal pdf and standard normal cdf.   
22 We experimented with several different models for this second stage regression.  Using the Adjusted R-
squared as our primary model fitting criteria we settled on this one.  In particular we found that the 
presence of the dummy variables for gulf license holders exhibited degrading collinearity with the length 
variable.  Because they came out to be statistically insignificant, we dropped them from the model. 
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From Table 3.5 two effects become clear immediately.  The first is that age still 
has an impact on bid size even after controlling for differences in participation through  
the inverse mills ratio.  In particular, it appears that, holding all else constant, a one-year 
change in age equates to about a $60 increase in bid size.  When combined with the 
information that older fishermen tend to be more likely to participate, this is an 
interesting result.  It suggests that, overall, younger fishermen are less likely to bid in the 
auction, but those young license holders that bid do so with a stronger intent to leave the 
fishery.  It is possible that this result reflects a difference in effort between these two 
groups.  That is, among fishermen who chose to participate, the auction attracts young 
bidders who shrimp only part-time or not at all and older bidders who are full-time 
shrimpers possibly looking to retire.  
Second, the inverse mills ratio comes out as a statistically significant variable in 
the regression, which can be interpreted as validation for the two-step procedure.  In 
other words, the significance of the mills ratio confirms that there are systematic 
differences in participation across age classes. 
In this section I have examined the effects of age, price, and vessel length on 
auction behavior and auction outcomes. Here I have proposed a Heckman 2-Stage 
procedure as a first attempt at estimating parameters of the bidding function.  I find that 
on average bids increase by $107 for each foot of length of the vessels.  Since one of the 
underlying objectives of this research is to identify the value of a license, this 
relationship provides a first estimate of the reservation price function.    
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There are, however, some limitations to this approach.  First, I find that on 
average, and controlling for length and age of owner, bids are declining from round to 
round.  This immediately calls into question the ability to infer from the bids evidence 
about the reservation price of the vessels.  Economic intuition would suggest that lower 
valued bids would tend to be bought out earlier so that the average value of licenses in 
the fishery would rise over time.  Since the results from the second-stage regression runs 
exactly counter to this result, it calls into question the ability to infer directly from the 
bids evidence about the underlying value of licenses. Secondly, I find that, even after a 
sample selection correction, the model had very little explanatory power.   
In Chapter IV I provide an alternative to this static estimation that is capable of 
capturing the dynamic elements of the bidder’s decision process.  In particular, the 
sequential auction allows bidders the opportunity to gather information about the 
agency’s willingness to pay for a license.  This informational effect is largely ignored in 
the model presented here.  The OLS estimation used here implicitly assumes a 1:1 
relationship between the bid and the fisherman’s reservation price.  In the next chapter I 
propose an econometric model which relaxes this assumption by incorporating the 
fisherman’s subjective expected probability of success in the auction.  The 2-Step 
estimation procedure carried out here suggests that license holder age, shrimp price, and 
vessel length are important elements of the bid function.  In Chapter IV I will attempt to 
incorporate these factors into a dynamic econometric model which will also be capable 
of capturing the learning that goes on in a sequential auction. In the next section I take an 
initial look at how bidding behavior has changed over time. 
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Information Effects 
The sequential nature of this auction allows bidders to use information from past 
successes or failures to form optimal bids in the current round.  Each round they are 
allowed to extract information from the agency and update their expectations regarding 
the probability for success in the auction.  In this section I present auction trends 
illustrating the importance of learning.   
One can observe evidence of this learning by referring to Figures 3.4 – 3.623.  In 
the early rounds, bids are widely dispersed.  But by the 14th round of the auction, they 
become very concentrated around the average buyback price.  These data suggest that 
bidders are learning about the probabilities of having particular bids granted as the 
auction progresses and using this information to revise bids for later rounds. 
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Figure 3.4. TX License Buyback Auction Round 1 Bids 
 
                                                 
23 For illustrative purposes, bids above $40,000 are not shown. 
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Figure 3.5. TX License Buyback Auction Round 6 Bids 
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Figure 3.6. TX License Buyback Auction Round 14 Bids 
 
To gauge how bidders take advantage of this sequential auction in preparing their 
bids we can look at the bidding histories of auction participants.  There are roughly 800 
unique owners in the data set who have submitted bids in the auction.  Of these unique 
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owners, 406 have submitted bids in multiple rounds.  That is, about half of all bidders in 
the auction have participated in multiple rounds.   
Our data on whether bids were granted or not tells an interesting story that is 
consistent with the idea that the sequential auction may induce a speculative motive.  Of 
the almost 1,700 unique licenses in the auction, 796 have been bid on unsuccessfully (not 
granted) at least once.  In percentage terms this means that around 47% of all the assets 
offered for sale in this auction were offered at a price greater than that which the agency 
was willing to pay.  Among the 1,177 licenses that were sold from round 2 through the 
14th round, 363 of these had a prior bid rejected by TPWD before selling.  This means 
that roughly one out of every three licenses surrendered through the buyback auction was 
bid on in a round prior to that in which it was ultimately sold.   
I find that most bidders who sell a license after repeated bidding use a strategy of 
bidding high early and lowering their bids monotonically in subsequent rounds, zeroing 
in on their sell-out price from above.  Two-thirds of the repeat bid licenses have been 
sold using this approach.   
The No Sale Option 
A unique feature of this auction is that it offers fishermen an opportunity to 
withdraw their bids after observing whether the bid was granted.  Once the agency 
decides to grant a bid they inform the license holder and, at this time, the fisherman can 
decide to either execute the sale of the license or withdraw the bid.  If the bid is 
withdrawn, the license holder can continue fishing and possibly participate in the auction 
again later.  About 6% of the licenses that have been bid on through round 14 have 
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rejected an offer from TPWD at least once.  Most of these licenses remained in the 
fishery as of the 14th round of the auction but 32 of them had been sold.  Seven of these 
were sold for less than the originally rejected offer.  Of the ones which collected positive 
returns, the average return on exercising the no-sale option was about $1,700.24   
Although it may sound irrational to sell a license for less then a higher bid which 
was granted earlier in the auction, there is a plausible explanation for this behavior which 
hinges on risk aversion: consider a fisherman who is experiencing a good return on his 
license and is not strongly considering leaving the fishery.  The fisherman decides to 
submit a bid of $6,000 just to see if the agency will take it.  The agency does but on 
further reflection the fisherman decides to keep the license.  Two years later returns have 
become quite poor for the fisherman and he is desperate to sell back his license.  He 
knows that the agency was once willing to pay $6,000 for his license, but also knows that 
the price the agency pays depends on all other bidders in the market and, therefore, 
reasonably fears that a bid of $6,000 may not be granted.  This plausible situation might 
lead a fisherman to actually reduce his bids below a price that was previously accepted.  
As stated earlier, these fishermen selling for a price below one that was previously 
granted are anomalies.  Most bidders who sell after rejecting an offer from the agency do 
so at a price higher than that which was previously granted.  If such withdrawals were 
common the agency would be spending much more to buy out the same number of 
licenses than would be retired if all bids were binding.  And this is a concern since the  
 
                                                 
24 Return was calculated as the difference between the bid that was granted then rejected and the bid that 
was ultimately granted then accepted.  These figures are net of license cost. 
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no-sale option as this gives bidders the ability to reject an offer in order to find the 
highest price the agency would pay for their license.  After all, when a fisherman 
observes that bid b is granted, they know that the agency is willing to pay at least $b for 
the license and might be willing to pay more.   
In fact, relatively few fishermen exercise this option and the cost to agency has 
been small.  Summing the return to future bidding of all 32 individuals that sold a license 
after rejecting an earlier round offer, I calculate that the agency spent an extra $44,000 
dollars to buy out these licenses, an increase of 26% over the total of the initial bids from 
these fishermen and only 0.5% of the total cost of the program through round 14.  
However, one cannot necessarily say that TPWD would have purchased these licenses 
for $44,000 less if all auction bids were binding because we don’t know if these license 
holders would have participated without the option to withdraw or that their bids would 
be unchanged.  It may be that the no-sale option serves an important function: 
convincing those who would normally be nervous about or intimidated by the auction to 
participate and allowing them to correct obvious mistakes in their bids.25   
Figure 3.7 below shows the returns captured on exercising the no-sale option.  As 
discussed, the impact of this auction feature is almost trivial.  Only 32 sales out of over 
1,200 were executed after previously rejecting an offer and $44,000 out of over $8 
million spent to purchase these.  Interestingly, seven bidders actually sold their licenses 
for an amount less than the price that was offered and rejected in earlier rounds. 
                                                 
25 The authors would like to thank Stuart Whitten of CSIRO for this insight.  We know of at least one case 
where the no-sale option was used to correct an obvious mistake.  One bidder, whose first bid of $900 in 
round 13 did not accept the buyback offer and then in the 14th round, just 2 months later, placed a bid for 
$9,000, apparently correcting an erroneous bid. 
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Finally, I present evidence of speculation in the comparison of the two types of 
rejections.  Recall that there are two ways in which a bid can fail to result in a sale: 1) the 
agency can choose not to grant the bid or 2) the agency may grant the bid and the 
fisherman can choose not to accept the offer.  The questions that naturally arise then are 
when would a fisherman choose not to accept an offer? And when would the agency 
choose not to grant a bid? 
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Figure 3.7. Returns to Rejecting an Offer After It Was Granted 
 
Presumably, an offer from TPWD would be rejected if the fisherman feels like 
they bid too low.  Likewise, the agency would choose not to grant a bid if they believe 
that the fisherman bid too high.  In this auction we observe that there are relatively few 
cases where the bidder bids too low.  Out of roughly 2,500 total bids over 14 rounds, 
there are only 151 cases where an offer was rejected by the fisherman.  In contrast, cases 
where the bidder bid too high are plentiful.  In 1,169 cases the agency has chosen not to 
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grant the bid.  This means that the TPWD has deemed almost half of all bids to be too 
high.  
Information Effects Summary 
In this section I have presented statistics related to the sequential nature of the 
buyback auction in order to illustrate the importance of learning.  Three results in 
particular paint an especially clear picture of the role of information in this auction.  
First, I have shown that bids as a function of vessel length are becoming tightly 
condensed over time.  Next, about half of all auction participants have submitted bids in 
multiple rounds.  And finally, I have shown that, among bidders who have bid in 
multiple rounds, most do so because they bid too high not too low.  Taken together these 
three findings suggest that there is probably an element of speculation at play in this 
auction. 
Summary of Lessons from the TX Shrimp License Buyback 
In this chapter I have presented trends from the Texas Inshore Shrimp License 
Buyback Program as a means for further understanding sequential buyback programs.  
Using license holder data on the inshore shrimp fleet over the first 7 years of the 
buyback, I find an increase in the average length for vessels in the fleet and a noticeable 
propensity for older license holders to sell out.  In examining how individual agents 
respond to the auction mechanism I find that a large portion of auction participants bid in 
multiple rounds, suggesting that learning may play a role in the bidding process. 
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While it is difficult to make causal statements without first trying to establish a 
counterfactual scenario, a few policy relevant observations can be made on the basis of 
this analysis.  First, there is evidence that the sequential auction framework has tended to 
induce speculation among its participants, probably inflating bids.  This result could have 
important implications for managers hoping to get the most “bang for their buck” from a 
buyback scheme.   
I have also shown that systematic differences exist in both auction participation 
rates and bidding behavior across age classes.  For managers concerned with social 
implications of buyback programs, this result will also be important.  In particular, I 
showed that older license holders were more likely to participate in the auction and were 
exiting the fishery through the buyback program faster than young ones.  This result may 
be seen as favorable or unfavorable depending on where the agency falls with respect to 
the three goals of buyback programs quoted from Holland et al. (1999) in the 
introduction.  If the buyback program is seen as a vehicle for providing transfer 
payments to the industry then it may perfectly acceptable to buyout older license holders 
faster as it could signal that the money is going to the “most deserving.”  However, if the 
overriding goal of the program is remove the most effort for the least money then the 
propensity to buyout older license holder may be a concern as it suggests the agency is 
buying out fishermen that were likely to retire anyway. 
Finally, I have presented in this chapter an elementary econometric model of the 
fisherman’s bid function.  While parameter estimates from this model suggest that vessel 
length, shrimp price, and license holder age are important drivers of bids submitted to the 
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auction, the counterintuitive coefficient on the round parameter and the low explanatory 
power of the model suggests that something is missing.  The Heckman procedure 
presented in this chapter is not capable of capturing the learning that is made possible 
when the same fisherman is allowed to bid on the same asset in multiple rounds of the 
auction.  In particular, I suspect that in any particular round of the auction a fisherman’s 
bid will be based not only on factors affecting the underlying value of the license (vessel 
length and shrimp price for example), but also on the fisherman’s perceived probability 
of success for any particular bid.  In the next chapter I will present an econometric model 
capable of estimating the primitive variables of the fishermen’s reservations price 
function by incorporating into the estimation the fact that bidding decisions take into 
account the sequential auction and over time bidders learn more and more about the 
probabilities of success for particular bids. 
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CHAPTER IV 
AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF BIDDING IN SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS 
Introduction 
In 1995 the Texas State Legislature granted authority to the Texas Parks Wildlife 
Department (TPWD) to begin purchasing inshore (bay and bait) shrimp licenses from 
permit holders.  In doing so they created a rich and complex decision making 
environment for inshore shrimpers.  In this chapter I present a dynamic econometric 
model capable of describing the fisherman’s decision making process inside this 
environment and use the model to estimate the effects of key variables, such as vessel 
length and shrimp price, on the bidding function. 
The sequential auction format used by TPWD offers participants the opportunity 
to engage in strategic bidding for the purpose of gaining information about the agency’s 
willingness to pay for a license.  Therefore, I model the bidding decision as a dynamic 
optimization problem.  In order to estimate effects of key variables on the bidding 
function I nest this dynamic optimization algorithm inside of a hill-climbing routine, 
which will locate likelihood maximizing parameter estimates for the model.   
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: The next section will 
review the auction rules as motivation for our approach26.  The following section will 
discuss the contributions of this chapter in the context of two distinct bodies of literature.  
I then present the empirical model and apply it to data collected from the auction from 
                                                 
26 Readers interested in a full discussion of the institutional setting should refer back to Chapter III. 
 61
1997 to 2004 and present the results of our estimation.  Finally, I offer some 
interpretation of these results and conclusions. 
Motivation 
The Texas Inshore Shrimp License Buyback Program purchases bay and bait 
shrimp permits via a sequential, first price auction.  At the start of each bidding round 
license holders may state a price at which they are willing to sell their license.  TPWD 
then scores these bids27 and makes formal offers to buy as many of the top scored bids as 
their budget for that round allows.  At that point the license holder has an opportunity to 
withdraw his or her bid and keep the permit or sell the permit for the bid price.  For this 
reason one must distinguish between a bid that is accepted by TPWD and a bid that is 
accepted by the fisherman.  In the language of this program a bid is “granted” if it is 
accepted by TPWD and a bid is said to be “accepted” if the offer from TPWD is accepted 
by the fisherman.  In order for a license to be bought back it must be granted and 
accepted.  Once a license is bought back it is retired from the fishery. 
Literature Relevant to the Estimation of Dynamic Decision Processes 
This chapter makes a contribution to the literature on estimation of dynamic 
models.  More specifically, our estimation procedure is an important methodological 
contribution to the literature on dynamic decision processes. 
                                                 
27 Bids are scored based on the length of the vessel being bid on, under the assumption that catch is 
positively correlated with length. 
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Dynamic Decision Processes 
The starting point for our estimation procedure is the seminal 1987 paper by John 
Rust.  Rust (1987) developed the nested fixed point algorithm allowing the estimation of 
parameters of an optimal stopping problem and in Rust (1988) he provided a guide to 
maximum likelihood estimation of dynamic optimization problems.  Also, in his chapter 
in The Handbook of Econometrics (1994), Rust lays out quite clearly the details of and 
assumptions necessary for maximum likelihood estimation of dynamic decision 
processes.  Prior to Rust’s paper, estimation approaches for dynamic decision problems 
required highly restrictive functional form assumptions that would not be suitable in the 
current setting.  
Some other helpful applications and discussions of the estimation techniques for 
dynamic decision processes have come from Miranda and Schnitkey (1995), Provencher 
and Bishop (1997) and Schjerning (2005).  Our problem contains two notable differences 
from those previously considered.  First, work in this area has traditionally focused on 
problems containing a binary control variable while our key “control” variable, the bid 
made by fishermen, is continuous over a range.  Second, I consider “state” variables 
which include the parameters of a subjective probability distribution and allow them to 
evolve following a Bayesian updating process as the fishermen get information from 
auction outcomes.  Thus our state transition is notably more complex than those models 
previously considered. 
 63
Model 
Here I am proposing a model capable of estimating the magnitude of speculation 
present in a sequential auction.  The approach can be summarized as follows.  The 
function R( ) captures the benefit, to the fisherman, of holding a license in the current 
period.  This function captures the financial returns on holding a license as well as the 
fisherman’s preferences for holding a license.  By estimating parameters of this function 
it is possible to identify differences in observed bids and the benefit function.  I label this 
difference the speculative premium.  In this section I present in detail the empirical 
model by which I will estimate the parameters of the function R. 
Data Generating Process 
Because observed bids come from a sequential auction I use a dynamic 
framework as the basis to describe the data generating process.  I assume that the bids 
from the auction are the result of license holders solving a dynamic optimization 
problem.  In this section I will present the details of this optimization problem. 
At the beginning of each round a fisherman chooses a bid,b  .  If the bid is granted 
by the TPWD then the fisherman must choose whether to accept the agency’s offer. A  is 
a binary variable defined as: 
sale executesbidder  if1
offer rejectsbidder  if0A  
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If the bid is not granted or is rejected28, the fisherman uses the license to fish in the 
current period and collects returns equals to R , a function to be estimated.  Define R  as a 
function of vessel characteristics, which are contained in the vector of state 
variables, ,tx a parameter vector , and an error term .  It is worth noting that ),;( txR  
includes the economic returns to fishing but is sufficiently general to include individual 
specific preferences and opportunity costs as well. 
A fisherman who does not sell his license in the current period collects benefits 
equal to R in that period but also has the opportunity to participate in the auction again 
next period.  Denote by );( 11  tt xV  the value of arriving in the next period in state 
.vector parameter  with 1 tx   The state vector 1tx captures vessel characteristics and 
the fisherman’s expectation as to whether a bid will be accepted.  Hence, for the 
fisherman who does not sell his or her license in the current period, the discounted 
present value of the stream of expected net benefits is ,1 tVR  where  is the discount 
factor. 
Since the fisherman cannot know with certainty which bids will be granted, the 
decision process is not deterministic.  Fishermen must submit their bids based on 
expectations about their probability for success.  I define ( , ; )tb x  as the subjective 
probability that bid b will be granted this round. The vector   contains the parameters of  
this subjective probability distribution which are themselves state variables.   
                                                 
28  In this chapter I am concerned with modeling bids submitted in the sequential auction and factors 
affecting those bids.  I do not consider those license holders that declined to participate in the auction.  
Although this treatment was necessary in order to estimate the desired effects, it does impose some 
limitations on the model.  The model at present is not capable of picking up idiosyncratic differences 
between bidders and non-bidders.    
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All the pieces are now present to formally define the fisherman’s decision 
problem.  In each round the fisherman chooses a bid in order to maximize his or her 
expected payoff.  This optimization problem can be stated formally as, 
    
 .),;(),;()1(
),;();(1);(max),;(
11
1,






ttt
tAbt
xVxRA
VxRbbbAxV
  (4.1) 
Learning 
The sequential format allows bidders to gather information as the auction 
progresses.  I model this learning through the state equation of our dynamic optimization 
problem.  The state equation of the dynamic programming (DP) algorithm, which is 
spelled out above, describes how fishermen use observed outcomes in one round of the 
auction to form expectations about their probability for success in the next round. 
Our approach to dealing with the learning that takes place inside of a sequential 
auction framework is a Bayesian updating process consistent with a uniform prior on the 
agent’s probability of success.  Bayesian updating occurs when an agent combines a 
prior probability with an observed outcome to form a posterior probability.  In the 
context of a sequential auction we can imagine that, before submitting a bid in the first 
round, the bidder forms an expectation regarding his or her probability of success with a 
particular bid.  The bidder then observes success or failure in the auction and updates the 
prior probability for the next round. 
In the sequential buyback auction the information available to the bidder in each 
round is limited.  Suppose the bidder submits a bid b which the agency does not grant.  
The bidder learns only that the agency’s reservation price for his or her license is 
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somewhere below b.  Learning takes place in our algorithm as fishermen combine prior 
expectations about the reservation price with observations from the auction to form new 
expectations regarding the range in which that agency reservation price falls.  Each time 
a license holder places a bid he or she gets a step closer to uncovering this price.  Here I 
examine the details of how information about this reservation price is transmitted in our 
model. 
Start by assuming that, in any round, the agency has a reservation price for each 
vessel in the auction.  This price is denoted as pˆ  and it represents the agency’s 
maximum willingness to pay for a license.  Also assume that this reservation price may 
increase over time.  The bidder’s priors in each round are captured by RPLo and RPHi.  
RPLo represents the highest bid that the agent believes will be granted with certainty and 
RPHi represents the bid at which the agent believes the probability of being granted is 
zero. 
When a license holder decides to place a bid in the auction there are two possible 
outcomes, each of which reveals a different piece of information.  If the bid, b, is granted 
by the agency then the fisherman knows that the actual RPLo is at least as large as b, so 
RPLo is revised upward.  If the bid is not granted then the fisherman knows that RPHi is 
at least as small as b, so RPHi is revised downward.   
The inclusion of growth parameter, g, and spread parameter, sigma, allow for the 
possibility that the agency’s reservation price rises over time. The agency’s reservation 
price for a vessel of particular length may be increasing with time to keep up with a 
natural rate of inflation but also because the supply of available licenses is diminishing.  
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This effect is captured by the parameter g.  The spread parameter adjusts the endpoints of 
the distribution according to the information received by the bidder.  It should be noted 
that these parameters are estimated by the model and no assumptions are made a priori 
about their values.   
For illustrative purposes we can imagine the updating process occurring in three 
steps.  These are pictured below in Figure 4.1.  The first stage depicts a prior subjective 
distribution with RPLo, RPHi, and a bid that falls inside the range.  Suppose that a bid, b 
is granted by the agency.  The first step in the updating process moves RPLo up to b 
since the fisherman now knows the agency is willing to pay at least b for the license.  
When a bid is granted the fisherman doesn’t learn anything directly about RPHi so it 
remains unchanged for the moment.  In the next step both RPHi and the new RPLo are 
adjusted by the growth factor g and the parameter sigma. 
In practice the fisherman’s subjective distribution is updated in a single step.  The  
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following equations define the state transition of our DP algorithm: 
grantednot  is bid if     )1/()1(*
granted is bid if           )1/()1(*
1 sigmagRPLo
sigmagb
RPLo
t
t 
  
and, 
 
grantednot  is bid if    )1)(1(*
granted is bid if    )1/()1(*)(
1 sigmagb
sigmagRPSpreadRPLo
RPHi ttt 
  (4.2) 
Using these values the value of . as defined is 111   ttt RPLoRPHiRPSpread   With these 
parameters, the posterior distribution is fully defined and the grant probability of a bid, b, 
in round k can be calculated using, 
k
k
kk RPSpread
RPLob
RPSpreadRPLob
)(
1),,(
  
With the state transition defined, next period’s value function, );( 11  tt xV can 
be approximated conditional on current values of the state variables.  Now with an 
approximation of the one period ahead value function we have all the pieces necessary to 
solve the decision problem in (4.1) for the optimal bid, b* for any state. 
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Figure 4.1. Prior and Posterior Expected Probabilities in the Sequential Bidding Problem 
When a Bid Is Granted 
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Now consider the following simple numerical example of probability updating in 
the sequential auction.  Suppose a fisherman with a 32 foot vessel submits a bid of 
$10,000 in the first round.  The fisherman observes that the bid is not granted and 
therefore knows that the agency’s reservation price is less than $10,000.  In the second 
round this fisherman bids $4,000 and has that bid granted.  If the fisherman then rejects 
this grant, he or she enters the third round with the knowledge that the agency’s 
reservation price for her license is somewhere between RPlo= $4,000 and 
RPHi=$10,000.  In each round the fisherman observes whether a bid was granted and 
updates his or her expectations about the true reservation price accordingly. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the prior subjective distribution for this fisherman. 
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Figure 4.2. Prior Subjective Distribution for RPLo = $4,000 and RPHi= $10,00029 
                                                 
29 RPLo and RPHi are defined in equation (4.2) 
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Practical Considerations 
The normative decision rule arising from the structure of our data generating 
process says that bidders chose their bid such that, 
    * 1 1arg max [ (1 )( )] (1 )( )t t t t tb b b A R V b R V            
I find however that very few bidders ever exercise their right to reject an offer30.  
Because the number of actual observations in which A = 0 is so small and because this 
second control variable would expand the dimensions of a problem which is already 
pushing the limits of our numerical capabilities, I treat these observations as outliers and 
discard them.  This leads to a new, more practical statement of our problem, 
]});()[;(1(]);({[max 1 tttb VxRbbbvt   
and this is the model which will actually be implemented. 
 However, because the model is attempting to explain a rich decision environment 
with only a few parameters we must account for deviations from this normative rule.  To 
account for these deviations an error term is included and the decision problem can be 
written in estimable form as,  
 
ititit
ittttbit
bb
VxRbbbb
it



 
*
)]}();())[;(1();({maxarg* 11  (4.3) 
That is, the error for observation i is the difference between the actual bid and that which 
would be dynamically optimal for a given set of parameters. 
                                                 
30 We find that the total number of times that a fisherman rejected an offer from TPWD is less than 1% of 
total number of bids from the auction. 
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The Estimator 
From this expression for the optimal bidding problem one can see that  is the 
difference between actual and predicted bids.  Given this expression, parameter estimates 
for the model are obtained by finding the value of  that minimizes the sum of squared 
errors, i.e, * , is that which solves the problem, 
i t
it .min   
 The task of calculating the error term for each observation is a critical step in our 
estimation process.  Because understanding this process may aid an overall 
understanding of our algorithm I provide some detail on this calculation here.  Suppose 
that one observes bidder i arriving in round 2 of the sequential auction with a 32 foot 
vessel.  The solution to the dynamic optimization problem provides an optimal bid, b* 
for this bidder conditional on the parameters in .   Suppose we observe that this 
individual actually bids b in round 2.  We can then calculate the error for this agent in 
round 2 of the auction for parameter vector  , as .*ititit bb   
 There are two important conditions imposed on the model which effect the 
calculation of the error term.  The first is that all bidders are repeat bidders.  That is, the 
sample is restricted only to those agents who have participated in the auction in more 
than one round.  Second, I assume that information is gained only through bidding.  That 
is, I assume that a bidder will learn about the probability of future bids being accepted by 
hearing how the agency responds to his or her bids.31  So bids can be thought of as being 
                                                 
31 The assumption that this is the only source of information for the fishermen is obviously quite 
restrictive.  Nonetheless, for reasons of computational limits, it was the most complex specification that we 
were able to estimate.  
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numbered sequentially rather than being associated with a particular round.  A short 
numerical example will help illustrate this point. 
The infinite horizon DP will solve for a b* in each round of the auction.  Recall 
that b* will be a function of the parameters in .   In particular, vessel length and the 
initial RPLo will help determine b* in the first period of the DP, .*1b   Equation (4.2) 
shows how the distributional parameters are revised and these parameters will then 
influence .*2b   For a given starting value of PLo (determined by the parameter vector) 
the DP algorithm will produce a b* for each round of the auction and one can think of 
each of these as being associated with an RPLo for that round.  Now suppose that we 
observe an individual that submits the following bids in three rounds:  
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The DP module has produced the array ]*,....,*,[ 1421 bbbb  and I would like to compare 
these values to observed values in order to calculate the errors for individual i.  To do 
this I compare *  to 11 bb , regardless of whether 1b actually took place in round 1 or round 
10. 
The sum of squared errors (SSE) approach is very intuitive.  In essence I am 
simply defining a dynamically optimal solution and trying to minimize the distance 
between that solution and observed behavior.  However, as will be shown, solving this 
minimization problem in practice is quite difficult. 
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Estimation 
In the data set we have observations for roughly 800 fishermen over 14 rounds of 
bidding.  For each fisherman in each round we know the number of assets they hold, the 
size of their bid, whether TPWD granted that bid and, if the bid was granted, whether the 
bidder accepted the offer.  Additionally, the data include individual vessel characteristics 
such as length.  Although horsepower and location were also included in the data, these 
are excluded from the analysis here for several reasons. First, in personal 
communications, TPWD staff indicated that they do not place much confidence in the 
horsepower data.  Secondly, our computational limits impose significant limitations on 
how many variables can be incorporated in the model.  Finally, in work cleaning the data 
it was found that horsepower data frequently changed from year to year (for the same 
vessel) in ways that appeared arbitrary and more indicative of data error than true 
variation in the underlying variable, which might also be the reason that TPWD does not 
trust the data on horsepower variable.   The task here is to estimate parameters which 
show the effects of these variables on the bidding function. 
Parameters 
Before proceeding further with the discussion of the estimation routine, let’s 
review the parameters in our model that will be estimated.  The estimable parameters are 
those related to the bidder’s subjective probability distribution and parameters of the 
benefit function. 
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Distributional Parameters 
First, the initial values of the two state variables must be estimated, 0RPLo and 
0PSpread .  Recall that 0RPLo and 0RPSpread  define the first prior subjective 
distribution that the bidder faces.  In each subsequent period 1tRPLo and 
1tRPSpread are derived from tRPLo and tRPSpread  using actual bids in t, the growth 
parameter g and the spread parameter sigma.  Hence, g and sigma are also estimated. 
The Benefit Function 
Up to this point I have been rather general about the benefit function, R.  
Previously R was defined as a function of parameters , and independent variables, x. 
The theoretical model does not impose any restrictions on the functional form of R.  
However, because of the numerical intensity of our estimation algorithm there is a heavy 
penalty for non-parsimony.  Therefore, in practice I use a relatively simple linear model 
for the benefit function R.   
In any year the benefit of holding a license is assumed to be equal to the net 
revenue generated by the asset, say-MC, where M indicates gross revenue and C 
indicates gross costs.  If individual agents’ landings were available then gross revenue 
could actually be calculated, 
)/($ lbpriceshrimpshrimpoflbstotalM  . 
However, since there is no data on individual landings, I use vessel length, L, as a 
proxy for catch.  The gross revenue function can be written as, 
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Here y(L) may be thought of as the pounds landed function, where there is some 
autonomous portion of landings, 1y , and a portion, 2y ,that depend on the size of the 
vessel.  Likewise, C(L) is written as a linear function of vessel length: 
1 2( )C x c c L   
Expanding the benefit function using the pieces above we have, 
  1 2 1 2, .R L p py py L c c L     (4.4) 
 
giving the parameter vector =(y1, y2, c1, c2). 
In sum the parameter vector I am seeking to estimate contains four parameters 
which define the bidder’s subjective probability distribution and four parameters of the 
benefit function R: ].,,,,[ 00  gPSpreadPLo     
Estimation Algorithm 
In the previous section I discussed the estimator that will be used for the model.  
The problem now is to find the values of the parameter vector, ,  which minimize the 
sum of squared errors (SSE).  The algorithm used to carry out this minimization was 
programmed using Fortran 90.  A short discussion of a few of the programming details 
will help illustrate some important details of our estimation procedure and also illuminate 
some of the challenges in attempting to estimate this type of model. 
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First I provide a brief overview of the algorithm.  The general structure of the 
program works as follows: the main program chooses parameter values for the model, 
the Dynamic Programming (DP) modules use these parameters to solve the infinite 
horizon DP. The DP model yields an optimal policy function, b*(), which can be used to 
predict the “optimal” bids for each observed bidder.  The econometric modules use 
observed data points and optimal state dependent bids from the DP to calculate the Sum 
of Squared Errors, where it is defined in (4.3).  The algorithm then returns to the main 
program which chooses new parameters.  The program operates according to the flow as 
presented in Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3. Flow of the Econometric Model 
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It should be noted that the overall set up of the program is general enough to 
accommodate different approaches to finding the optimal set of parameters.  The method 
I use to find the minimum SSE parameter vector is an adaptive grid.  Using the adaptive 
grid search algorithm a sparse grid is first chosen and then, after observing actual values 
found, the grid is refined until the “best possible” parameters are identified.  Each time a 
grid search is implemented, grids for the parameter are defined in the main module and 
the program runs until the SSE for each possible parameter combination has been 
evaluated.  The combination of parameters with the lowest SSE is the best estimate based 
on the optimization criterion.  Because of the highly non-linear nature of the objective 
function I found the simplicity of the grid search to be quite advantageous. Further, 
although more sophisticated nonlinear hill-climbing algorithms might yield more precise 
estimates of the parameters, given the parsimonious model specification, such precision 
is inconsistent with the true precision of the econometric model.  
Grid Search 
Using the grid search method, the program evaluates the sum of squared errors at 
a number of pre chosen points in order to find that vector which minimizes the chosen 
distance measure.  This is a computationally intense process but, given the shape of our 
objective function, a necessary one.  In each iteration of the grid search algorithm, grids 
are defined for each of the estimated parameters.  A grid is defined by a minimum value, 
a maximum value and a number of points between the two to evaluate.  For example, if 
the y1 grid is defined as having a minimum at 0, a maximum at 10 and 10 grid points then 
it can be illustrated by the following vector, 
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The ith grid point in the this grid for example is given by, 
)1/(min)1max1(*)1(min1)(1  nyyiyiGridy , 
where n is the total number of grid points.  Once grids have been defined for each of the 
parameters, the algorithm will search for the value of the parameter vector , which 
minimizes the sum of squared errors by evaluating the SSE at every possible 
combination of grid points.   
Practical Restrictions 
As mentioned previously, the solution algorithm is computationally very intense.  
For example, with only 10 points in each parameter grid the program still must undergo 
108 iterations.  And inside each of theses iteration the infinite horizon dynamic 
programming problem must be solved.  As a practical matter, there are a number of steps 
that have been taken to reduce the computational intensity of this algorithm.   
The first of these is to evaluate the DP only inside those iterations where it is 
necessary.  Although the econometric subroutines must be evaluated at every parameter 
change, the outcome of the DP will only change with changes in the distributional 
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parameters, g and sigma, which affect the state equation in the DP model.  A short 
discussion of why this is so follows.   
The optimal bid, b*, is a function of the state variables RPLo, RPSpread, and R.  
In practice, the DP is actually solved for a small number of possible states and 
Chebychev polynomial approximation is used to smooth the value function over the full 
range of state variables.  The solution to the DP problem yields a b* matrix which 
contains an optimal bid as a function of each combination of the possible states.  The 
econometric subroutine uses linear interpolation to determine which element of this b* 
matrix is relevant for a particular bidder.  This means that changes in the parameters of 
the R function (y1, y2, c1, c2) don’t affect the calculation of the b* matrix, they 
determine which element of that matrix is used for a particular bidder.  The parameters g 
and sigma, because they affect the state transition of the DP, have an affect on the one-
period ahead value function 1tV .  Therefore, changes in these parameters will affect the 
calculation of the b* matrix.  It is therefore possible to economize on run time by calling 
to the DP module only for values of  which contain changes in g or sigma.  
Another way efficiency is promoted in the algorithm is by imposing a theoretical 
restriction on the parameter c2.  Recall that the benefit function in our model is written as 
xccxpypypxR 2121),(  , 
and that the parameter c2 reflects that portion of costs that are dependent on vessel 
length.  In the estimation I impose the restriction 2 0c   which saves run time by only 
searching for optimal values of c2 in the positive direction. In the adaptive search 
algorithm, the approach was to focus first on those parameters for which the value 
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function seemed to be responsive to small changes in the parameter values.  Although all 
possible care was taken to ensure that the final estimates were robust, the possibility that 
this iterative approach ended with suboptimal parameter vectors cannot be ruled out.  On 
the other hand, this would also be true if a nonlinear hill-climbing algorithm were used – 
because the optimization problem is not convex, there is no numerical algorithm that will 
guarantee that a global optimum is found.  
Results 
The main objective of the empirical model is to estimate the speculative premium 
induced by the sequential auction.  The speculative premium is a quantity derived from 
parameter estimates of the benefit function.  In this section I will present the estimated 
parameter values and use these estimates to derive the speculative premium. 
Data 
 One of the primary goals this study is to identify the way in which learning, as 
allowed by the sequential auction, influences bidding behavior.  For this reason the 
model is estimated using a subset of our data containing only those bidders who 
participated in more than one round.  There were a total of 1,642 observations used in the 
estimation.  The average vessel length for observations in the sample was 33 feet.  The 
average bid for the sample is shown in Figure 4.4 below.  Average shrimp price for the 
Texas bay system is also shown in the table below. 
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Figure 4.4. Average Bid and Price by Round in the TX Shrimp License Buyback 
Auction 
Source: TPWD  
 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter estimates were obtained through the grid search algorithm by running 
the estimation program many times and tightening the bounds of selected grids on each 
run.  In practice it simply was not feasible to chose wide bounds for each grid and allow 
the algorithm to search over a large number of grid points for the optimal solution.  With 
8 parameters even evaluating the model at ten grid points in each dimension would 
require 108  iterations.  At the current rate of 0.03 seconds per iteration, running the 
model with 8 parameters and 10 grid points would require roughly 833 hours of 
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computing time.  For this reason we carried out several experiments to find the range in 
which optimal parameter values could be expected to fall.  This allowed us to keep the 
grids used to obtain the final estimates relatively small.  The final model was estimated 
with the following grids: 
 
Table 4.1  
Final Parameter Grids and Estimates32 
  
Grid 
points Min max Optima 
y1 8 95 105 101.25 
y2 8 0 5 2.5 
c1 1 0 0 0 
c2 1 0 0 0 
RPLoStart 5 0 5,000 1,000 
RPSpreadStart 5 5,000 25,000 15,000 
G 5 0 0.25 0 
Sigma 5 0 0.25 0 
Observations 1,642    
R-squared 0.139    
 
Parameter estimates obtained from the model are also shown in Table 4.1.  Here I 
present these estimates and discuss their importance to our analysis.  Recall that the 
function R was previously defined as, xccxpypypxR 2121),(  .  Combining the 
estimated parameters with 2005 prices for an average sized vessel (32 feet) results in a  
predicted R value of around $570, which is consistent with information obtained from 
industry experts.33 
                                                 
32 The distributional parameters RPLoStart, RPSpreadStart, G, and Sigma are defined in equation (4.2).  
The parameters of the benefit function y1, y2, c1, and c2 are described in equation (4.4) 
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 In addition to this informal model validation we also have a goodness of fit 
statistics.  The measure chosen for this model is the 2R statistic.  2R  measures the 
proportion of the sample variation in actual bids which is explained by the model and is 
calculated as, 
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The 2R statistic shows that our model explains almost 14% of the sample variation in the 
bids.  Considering the parsimonious specification of the model and complexity of the 
decision making environment 139.02 R is promising. 
Model Validation 
 The structure of this model – a dynamic programming problem nested within an 
outer minimization algorithm – does not lend itself easily to conventional hypothesis 
testing.  However, the quality of the empirical model can be analyzed by consulting a 
variety of somewhat primitive measures. 
                                                                                                                                                
33 In personal conversations with Robin Reichers of the Coastal Fisheries Division of Texas Parks and 
Wildlife he has relayed his feeling that many of the bidders in this auction were suffering from poor 
returns. 
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Model Performance 
 I have shown that the optimal parameter estimates obtained from the grid search 
method explain roughly 14% of the total sample variation in bids.  In addition to the R-
squared measure, examining the difference between actual and predicted bids will also 
give a sense of how well the model fits. 
 In Table 4.2 below I show the mean absolute error (MAE) by bid number.  
Because it is assumed that information is gained only through bidding, it makes sense to 
express the deviations between observed bids and predicted bids in terms of bid number 
rather than round.34 
Although the difference in actual versus predicted bids is initially quite high, the 
model performs relatively well after the first bids.  The overall MAE for the entire 
sample is 50.1% of observed bids, which may seem high, however it should be 
remembered that the computational intensity of this estimation procedure forces us to 
search for optima over very course grids.   
 
                                                 
34 To reiterate: the model treats a bidder participating in the auction for the first time as an uninformed 
bidder, even if this first bid is placed in the 13th round. 
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Table 4.2  
Mean Absolute Error by Bid Number 
Bid 
Number Observations MAE MAE (%) 
1 624 $6,225.91 65.8% 
2 624 $2,995.60 47.0% 
3 220 $2,813.91 37.0% 
4 89 $2,136.33 28.2% 
5 37 $3,291.09 27.8% 
6 19 $3,869.09 31.7% 
7 9 $4,071.67 43.2% 
8 7 $4,622.62 28.3% 
9 5 $3,880.24 24.3% 
10 5 $2,324.53 23.9% 
11 2 $3,676.99 32.7% 
12 1 $926.19 14.2% 
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One of the principal objectives of this chapter was to develop an empirical model 
capable of incorporating the learning made possible by the sequential auction format.  
Given that objective one must judge model quality not only on how the model fits overall 
but also how well it fits the dynamics of the bidder’s decision problem.  Figure 4.5 shows 
that our model systematically predicts in excess of observed first bids.  Given the 
uninformed nature of the bidders at this stage, this is not surprising.35   However, in 
Figure 4.6 note that the model fit improves substantially in the 2nd round, suggesting that 
the model is capturing the bidders’ updating process.    
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Figure 4.5. Actual and Predicted 1st Bids36 
                                                 
35 The reader may want to refer to Figure 3.4 from the previous chapter and note the dispersion among 
bids.  Fitting a model to this particular subset of data would certainly be a near impossible task. 
36 Figure 4.5 is truncated at $4,000 and $20,000 for illustrative purposes. 
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Figure 4.6. Actual and Predicted 2nd Bids 
 
Standard Errors of the Point Estimates 
 A complicating feature of this model is that the DP must be re-run for each 
change in RPLo, RPSpread, g, or sigma.  Because of this structure it is very costly (in 
computing time) to improve the precision around estimates for these parameters.  As a 
result, estimates for these distributional parameters are not likely to be robust to small 
changes in the sample and little meaning could be attached to standard errors.   
 To ensure that the best estimates for these parameters within the feasible search 
range have been selected I perform a check on the objective function values in the RPLo 
and RPSpread dimensions.  Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show the top 200 objective function 
values and the associated RPLo and RPSpread values. 
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Figure 4.7. Objective Function Values in the RPLo Dimension 
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Figure 4.8. Objective Function Values in the RPSpread Dimension37 
 
 In Figure 4.7 the top 200 objective function value and their associated values for 
the parameter PLo are shown.  From the figure it is clear that the best objective function 
                                                 
37 For Figures 4.7 and 4.8 the parameters RPLo and RPSpread are defined in equation (4.2) 
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values occur at low RPLo values.  Among the grid points that were evaluated in the 
RPLo dimension, 1,000 and 1,500 clearly yield the best objective function values. 
 Figure 4.8 shows the top 200 objective function values and their associated 
RPSpread values.  Here, the dominance of the RPSpread estimate (over the alternatives) 
is pronounced.  Note that among the top 200 objective function values only two of the 
five points in the RPSpread grid appear (12,000 and 15,000).  All other values for 
RPSpread evaluated by the grid search algorithm were associated with objective function 
values outside the top 200. 
 In the current set up it is imperative to keep the dimensionality of the problem as 
low as possible.  To address this need we use very course grids in our search for optimal 
values of RPLo and RPSpread.  This approach imposes some important limitations in 
terms of our ability to express confidence in the quality of estimated parameters.  Since 
we only evaluate 5 possible values for RPLo and RPSpread we cannot say with certainty 
that we have found the best estimates of the true RPLo and RPSpread.  With finer 
evaluation grids we would almost certainly find RPLo and RPSpread parameters which 
offered an improvement over the current estimates.  However Figure 4.7 and 4.8 
illustrate that, although it may be possible to find better estimates by increasing the 
precision of the search algorithm, one would expect these “better” estimates to occur in a 
neighborhood around the current estimates.  That is, due to the limitations associated 
with the nested DP structure of our model, I cannot say that our RPLo and RPSpread 
estimates are necessarily the best, however the estimates are certainly the best among all 
evaluated alternatives.   
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Because the model involves solving a DP problem for changes in the parameter 
space the precision around estimates of RPLo, RPSpread, g, or sigma cannot be 
increased without increasing run-time dramatically.  For estimates of the parameters of 
the R function however, it is possible to use finer grids in the search algorithm at low 
cost, making it possible to calculate standard errors around the estimates for y1 and y2.  
Greene (2003) shows how standard errors can be calculated for Maximum 
Likelihood estimates.  Although the estimator used here is the minimization of the sum 
of squared errors and not the maximization of a likelihood function, I will show that the 
following approach can be used to derive standard errors for this model as well. 
The general approach is to use the inverse of the information matrix to calculate 
these standard errors.  The asymptotic covariances are given by the expected values of 
the second-derivitives of the likelihood function. 
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The estimator for the asymptotic covariance matrix is computed by evaluating the actual 
second derivatives at the optimal parameter values. 











 
'
)()( ^^
^21^^

 LI  
 92
Conceptually, standard errors provide us with a measurement of how robust point 
estimates are.  The second derivatives, contained in the information matrix, tell us how 
the slope of the likelihood function changes as we move slightly away from the optimal 
point.  Intuitively, if the slope is changing rapidly we know the likelihood function is 
very steep in the neighborhood of the optimum.  If this is the case then we are likely to 
be more confident in our point estimates.  However, the flatter the likelihood function 
around the neighborhood of the optimum, the less confident we are likely to be in our 
estimates.   
Since I use a minimum distance measure as the criteria for finding optimal 
parameters of the model, the calculation of standard errors is slightly different from 
Greene’s Maximum Likelihood presentation.  However, the calculations serve the same 
basic function.  In this model estimates are obtained by minimizing an objective function 
which is the sum of the squared distance between observed and predicted bids.  The 
standard errors of the estimates can be approximated by observing how the objective 
function changes with slight movement away from the optimum. 
 In practice, the model is essentially a discrete approximation to a continuous 
process.  From the model estimation we obtain the optimal parameter vector, 





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25.101
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*
y
y . 
Because the optima are both interior grid points, it is possible to move one grid step in 
either direction around this optimal point and observe the likelihood function value at a 
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total of 9 points.  Figure 4.9 below shows the points of evaluation and the numerical 
derivatives associated with each.   
In the figure below we have .1031 and ,25.1011,5.991 321  yyy   The three 
points for y2 are .75.32 and ,5.22,25.12 321  yyy   At each of these points we have 
an objective function value, which is the sum of squared errors.  Using the standard 
expression for the log likelihood function of estimator  with error variance 2 , 
 2
22
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 XyXynLL   (4.5) 
we can transform objective function values into log likelihood values and use the inverse 
of the information matrix to calculate standard errors. 
First note that in the classic linear model the sum of squared errors associated 
with estimator   is )')((  XyXy  .  Also, an unbiased estimator of 2  is given by 
 Kn
s i
i


2
,  
where i is the error associated with observation i, n is the number of observations and K 
is the degrees of freedoms.  By substituting the quantities 2s and SSE into (4.5) it is 
possible to transform the SSE values at each grid point into log likelihood values. 
Looking along the rows of the matrix in Figure 4.7, one can see the partial 
derivatives with respect to y1.  Starting in the first cell and moving across the first row, 
one can see the 3 values of y1 which are used – one value on either side of the optimal 
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point (101.25).  Moving across this row, y2 remains constant and 2 partial derivatives 
can be calculated from these three points.  Starting in the first cell and moving down the 
first column, one can see the representations for two partial derivatives with respect to 
y2, evaluated at the first y1 value.  
Finding the second derivatives 
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38 The reader should note that, because we use uniform grids the distance between any two neighboring 
points in the grid is equal. 
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Figure 4.9.  Numerical Derivatives of the Implied Likelihood Function Around the 
Optimum 
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 Deriving the cross-partial derivatives for the information matrix, 
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 , is slightly more complex.  To calculate these values I use the change in the 
average partial derivatives.  For example, to get the cross-partial derivative of y1 with 
respect to y2 I use the following procedure: 
 With 3 values for both parameters there are 2 numerical partial derivatives at each 
value of y2 – for y2 = 1.25 the partials are 12 11
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change in the likelihood function with a change in y1, holding y2 = 2.5.  Averaging in 
this manner again for y2 = 2.5 and y2 = 3.75, gives 3 partial derivatives which can be 
differenced to provide an estimate for the cross-partial derivative, 
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  Here I have provided some technical details of our numerical approach to 
deriving the information matrix.  As an inherently numerical process the notation 
deviates somewhat from the standard textbook presentation of standard error 
calculations.  However, the reader should understand that this approach serves the same 
purpose as traditional standard error reporting – namely, to understand how the objective 
function is behaving in a neighborhood around the optimal parameter estimates. 
The table below provides estimates of the asymptotic covariance matrix of y1 and 
y2.  The matrix of second derivatives contains very large values, suggesting that the 
objective function is steep in the neighborhood of the optimal estimates.  This gives 
estimated standard errors for y1 and y2. 
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Table 4.3 
Standard Errors of the Parameter Estimates39 
  Y1 y2 
Y1 701.09
Y2 0.18
     
 The standard errors shown in Table 4.3 suggest that the estimate for y2 is very 
robust, while the estimate for y1 is not robust at all.  Figure 4.10 shows the 200 best 
objective function values in the y1 dimension.  From the figure it is clear that the 
objective function is not at all responsive to changes in y1 around the optimum. 
Figure 4.11 however, shows that the objective function is responsive to changes 
in y2.  Much like the difficulties discussed previously with attaching confidence to the 
grid search estimates of RPLo and RPSpread, it is difficult to say how robust the estimate 
of 2.5 for y2 would be to small changes around the value.  From Figure 4.11, it is clear 
that the best objective function values occur around the point estimate for y2.  So again, 
although it is not possible to say that the y2 estimate is the true objective function 
maximizing value, it is clear that the y2 estimate is the best among all values in the set 
which made estimation feasible. 
 
 
                                                 
39 The reader may refer to equation (4.4) for definitions of the variables y1 and y2. 
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Figure 4.10.  Objective Function Values in y1 Dimension 
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Figure 4.11.  Objective Function Values in the y2 Dimension40 
 
                                                 
40 For Figures 4.10 and 4.11 the parameters y1 and y2 are defined in equation (4.4) 
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 In particular, it is important to understand the effect that the grid search 
algorithm has on the calculation of these errors.  Referring back to Figure 4.4, one can  
see that the grid steps for y1 and y2 are 2 and 1.25 respectively.  The extent to which the 
parameter estimates can be labeled robust, or “good”, is limited by how significant one 
considers a 2 unit change.  That is, we observe that the slope of the objective function 
changes dramatically as we move from the optimal y1 value of 101.25 down the grid to 
99.5 or up the grid to103.  Therefore, I can state confidently that the estimate for y1 is 
robust relative to the alternatives.  However, the model lacks the precision to state 
confidently whether 101.25 is a better estimator than 101.26.  
Heteroskedasticity 
Although there are well know formal tests for heteroskedasticity, Kennedy (2003) 
recommends preceding these with a visual inspection of residuals.  Figure 4.12 shows the 
model errors as a function of the independent variable vessel length.  The figure shows 
no evidence that the error variance is correlated with vessel length.   
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Figure 4.12.  Prediction Error by Vessel Length 
  
Figure 4.13 shows the model errors as a function of the independent variable 
price.  For the price variable, prediction errors tend to be higher at the higher price levels.  
From figure 4.14, one also notes that the number of observations in the sample appears to 
be correlated with the price.  This suggests a possible extension to the model.  Since 46% 
of the total observations in the sample come from the 5 rounds in which shrimp price 
exceeded $4/lbs, a sample selection correction may be in order here.  Unfortunately, the 
numerical intensity of the current model prohibits the introduction of more structure. 
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Figure 4.13.  Prediction Error by Shrimp Price 
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Figure 4.14. Sample Observations and Price 
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Identification 
 Estimates of the parameters c1 and c2 from our model are both 0.  This can 
probably be attributed to an identification problem rather a reflection of true parameter 
values.  Recall that the specification used to define the function R led to the reduced form 
equation, 
xccxpypypxR 2121),(  . 
In this equation the y2 and c2 parameters are both interacting with vessel length.  
Likewise y1 and c1 are both providing intercept terms, although y1 is scaled by the price 
variable.  The fact that c1 and c2 are estimated to be 0 is likely indicative of the fact that 
the model simply cannot distinguish between the competing effects of these coefficients.  
I have derived an expression for R using a gross revenue less cost approach.  However, it 
appears that what the model is really picking up is a single set of coefficients defining a 
net revenue function.   
 Identification in the econometric sense is a problem usually encountered with 
systems of equations.  As Kennedy41 (2003, p. 182) states: 
If you know that your estimate of a structural parameter is 
in fact an estimate of that parameter and not an estimate of 
something else, then that parameter is said to be identified: 
identification is knowing that something is what you say it 
is. 
 
If this analysis relied heavily on estimates of separate cost and revenue parameters then 
the identification problem discussed here might certainly be concerning.  However, the 
primary objective is to uncover the speculative premium, which is expressed as the 
                                                 
41 The reader may also want to refer to Kennedy (2003, p.184) for an intuitive discussion of the 
identification problem using a supply and demand example. 
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difference between observed bids and capitalized value of the asset.  This objective does 
not necessarily require that y1, y2, c1, and c2 all be econometrically identified and for 
this reason I do not address the identification problem here. 
Discussion 
Benefit Function 
Using the parameter estimates to calculate the implied values of R, it is clear that 
the bidders in this fishery are getting very low returns on their licenses.  Figure 4.15 
shows the value of R for the average vessel in the sample for each round.  From the 
figure, one can see that values of R range from a high of just over $800 in 2000 (round 8) 
to just above $500 in 2004 (round 13). 
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Figure 4.15. Implied R Values for Average Vessel42 
                                                 
42 The function R is defined in equation (4.4) 
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The Speculative Premium 
The parameters of the R function allow calculation of the speculative component 
present in bidding behavior in the sequential auction.  Here I present the derivation of the 
speculative premium and discuss its significance.   
By solving the dynamic decision problem stated in (2) the bidder learns his or her 
b* conditional on a set of parameters.  And by comparing those conditional b*s with 
observed decision the parameter vector * which minimizes the sum of squared errors 
was found.  With these parameter estimates, we can calculate the implied value of R 
which, when compared to observed bids gives the speculative premium. 
Figure 4.16 shows the average speculative premium by round for all vessels in 
the sample.  Figure 4.17 shows the average speculative premium for four representative 
vessel lengths based on quartiles of the distribution of all vessel lengths in the fishery. 
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Figure 4.16. Average Speculative Premium by Round for All Vessels 
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Figure 4.17. Average Speculative Premium by Round and Length Class 
 
From Figure 4.17 one can see that the difference between bid amount and the capitalized 
value of the asset (the license) is initially quite volatile.  This is consistent with the 
hypothesis of agent learning.  In the early round, when bidders are still learning about the 
agency’s willingness to pay relative to their own valuations, the speculative component 
is highly variable.  By about halfway through the sample however, it appears that bidders 
have settled in to a steady state level of speculation around $6,000.    
Summary of Empirical Work 
 The overarching goal of this chapter was to estimate the magnitude of speculation 
present in this sequential buyback auction.  This quantity plays a vital role in our cost 
benefit analysis of sequential versus one-time auctions, which I present in the next 
chapter.  However, in defining and estimating a model capable of measuring this 
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speculative component I have also presented several important empirical and 
methodological contributions. 
One important methodological contribution of this work is the estimator itself.  
As was discussed previously, models of this type are often estimated using a maximum 
likelihood approach where the likelihood function appears similar to that of a 
multinomial logit model.  When the control variable is discrete this approach is 
appropriate and its use is well documented in the literature (Rust, 1988; Provencher and 
Bishop, 1997; Schjerning, 2005 among others).  However, in this model the control 
variable, bid, is continuous.  The difference highlights an important contribution of this 
work.  Here I have presented a feasible estimator for a dynamic decision model with a 
continuous control variable. 
The model is also unique in that it incorporates the learning made possible by the 
sequential auction into the decision process.  I have shown here how a Bayesian updating 
procedure can be used to transmit information acquired in the current round and inform 
next period’s bidding.  The state equation provides a guide for how learning can be 
modeled inside of a nested dynamic optimization estimation routine. 
Although I have shown some large prediction errors present in the model, in 
estimating this model, I believe sufficient evidence has been provided to validate this 
approach.  In particular, the R-squared measure is higher than might otherwise be 
expected, considering the rich decision environment that is explained with only a few 
variables.  Furthermore, the model’s predictions improve greatly after one realized 
outcome, suggesting that the agent’s learning is being appropriately model.  And finally, 
 108
standard errors for the two parameters of the R function are low, suggesting that these 
estimates are relatively robust.  
  In short, although further refinements are necessary to achieve greater precision 
on the point estimates, I believe that the results of the estimation are sufficient both to 
validate this dynamic econometric approach and provide reasonable estimates for use in 
the next chapter’s policy simulation.  With respect to this last point, in achieving reliable 
estimates for parameters of the R function, I have found that bidders in the sequential 
auction do inflate their bids by a speculative premium.  This is certainly an important 
result for fisheries managers considering using a buyback program for capacity 
reduction.  However, more generally, it can be stated that the repeated game format of 
the sequential auction seems to offer agents an incentive to over bid relative to their true 
valuation.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF SEQUENTIAL 
VERSUS ONE-TIME BUYBACK AUCTIONS 
Introduction 
In their extensive survey of buyback programs Holland, Gudmundsson and Gates 
(1999) show that license buyback programs have been a popular management tool for 
addressing a range of fisheries management issues including overfishing and 
overcapacity.  Given the popularity of license buyback programs, it is important to 
understand the design and implementation issues of these programs as they relate to 
management goals.  In this chapter, I study how the key design issue of auction method 
will affect the ability of a buyback program to reduce capacity and generate rents in the 
fishery.  
Once the management authority has decided to implement a license buyback, 
they must consider how that program will be carried out, specifically, deciding how these 
licenses will be purchased.  The two most likely competing candidates here are via an 
agency stated price offering or a buyback auction.  Under a price offering system, the 
agency would simply state a price at which it is willing to buyback licenses and then buy 
permits back from as many willing sellers as the budget allows.  Under an auction 
system, the agency solicits bids from license holders and decides, based on bids and the 
management goals, how to allocate the budget among collected bids.  Although there are 
a number of interesting implications surrounding the auction versus pricing decision, 
they are beyond the scope of this analysis.  The point of departure for this study will be 
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an agency that has decided to implement a license buyback auction.  Readers interested 
in a discussion of the relative merits of an agency stated price buyout versus an auction 
mechanism should refer to Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1997). 
The next key design issue that the agency faces is whether the auction will take 
place in a single year or over time.  The current literature on buybacks exhibits a notable 
lack of discussion of this particular issue and there does not seem to be a clear preference 
among fisheries managers in the U.S. for one auction type over the other.  Of the two 
U.S programs discussed in Curtis and Squires (2007), one is a sequential buyback 
auction and the other a one-time buyback auction. 
Intuitively speaking, from the perspective of the managing agency, an advantage 
to one-time license buybacks (OTBs) over sequential buybacks (SBs) is that they remove 
the possibility of gamesmanship from the process of buying back permits.  By 
completing the buyout in a single year the agency does not allow participants to learn 
about the agency’s willingness to pay.  Intuition and economic theory suggest that this 
type of buyback auction should lead to stated buyout prices (bids) that are close to the 
individual’s true value.   
A notable disadvantage of the OTB relative to the SB is that the OTB requires all 
funding up front.  With a SB program the agency has the option of generating funds each 
year, through a tax for example43, and thereby funding itself.  A one-shot program, 
however, requires a much larger initial investment.  The relative importance of this will 
be the focus of our analysis here.  Another advantage of a SB program, which will not be 
                                                 
43 The Texas program funds buyouts partially through a fee assessed to the saltwater fishing stamp. 
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evaluated in this chapter, is that it provides the opportunity for managers to learn as the 
program proceeds.  I discuss that aspect in the concluding comments, but do not formally 
evaluate its significance here.  
In this chapter I compare two buyback programs with an equivalent pot of money 
spent two different ways.  I model a SB program with an annual budget that is exhausted 
each year over a ten year period and contrast this with a OTB program that has a budget 
equal to the present value of the SB’s stream of payments.  The setting for these policy 
comparisons will be the Gulf of Mexico’s shrimp fishery. 
In the next section I provide brief clarification of some terms that will be 
important to understand for this analysis.  Then I discuss the methodology for this study 
and introduce the General Bioeconomic Fisheries Simulation Model (GBFSM) which is 
used to simulate policy paths for our analysis.  The details of the scenarios considered for 
the policy comparisons are then presented.  Finally, I present the results of the simulation 
and conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis. 
Important Terms and Concepts 
“License” vs. “Permit” 
In this chapter it will be important to understand the distinction between the terms 
“license” and “permit.”  In the Gulf of Mexico a shrimp license is an asset which confers 
on its holder the right to shrimp in state waters only.  A permit allows the holder to fish 
for shrimp in federal waters.  When referring specifically to an asset allowing the holder 
to shrimp in federal waters the term “permit” will be used.  In all other instances the 
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general term “license” will be used, but will refer to a general license to participate, 
rather than a specific limited right to fish in state waters.  This is done since the term 
“license” (e.g. sequential license buyback), is the term conventionally used in the 
fisheries economics literature.  However, the reader should understand that comments 
about licenses in general also apply to a program buying back permits to fish in federal 
waters. When referring specifically to state licenses, I will indicate this.   
The Fishery 
The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act defines a 
fishery as: 
one or more stocks of fish which can be treated as a unit for purposes of 
conservation and management and which are identified on the basis of 
geographical, scientific, technical, recreational, and economic 
characteristics. 
In this chapter I use the term “fishery” to apply to the various regional shrimp stocks 
throughout the Gulf of Mexico as well as the Gulf as a whole.  In each of our simulated 
programs, “the fishery” will be defined by the management’s authority.  For example, 
when referring to the Texas Inshore Shrimp License Buyback Program, the term 
“fishery” will be used to refer to the inshore shrimp stock in Texas and those licensed to 
harvest that resource.  In this chapter I will also analyze simulated programs for capacity 
reduction in the Gulf of Mexico as whole.  The boundaries of “the fishery” will be 
assumed to extend as far as the authority of the program in question.  Moreover, I use the 
term “fishery” to apply only to the harvesting sector.  There are no effects on the 
processing sector, consumer, or any other direct or indirect impacts modeled here. 
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Methodology 
The overarching goal of the analysis in this chapter is to simulate a buyback 
program implemented with a SB auction and a program carried out via a OTB auction 
and compare their relative abilities to achieve the management goals of reducing 
capacity, increasing productivity, and increasing fishery rents.  To achieve this goal, I use 
results of the analysis of the SB auction that has been used by the Texas Parks and 
Wildlife Department (TPWD) to buy back Bay and Bait licenses in the Texas inshore 
shrimp fisheries.  The TPWD program is an ongoing auction that has been purchasing 
bay and bait licenses from inshore shrimpers since 1995.44  Using data from this auction, 
certain behavioral patterns can be identified which characterize how fishermen respond 
to the incentives of a SB auction.  In Chapter IV I estimated a model of bidding behavior 
using a dynamic econometric model.  The model included an estimate of the speculative 
premium.  In the previous chapter I also presented the details of that econometric model 
and the nested dynamic optimization algorithm used to obtain parameter estimates of that 
model.   
In this chapter I use the results from Chapter IV to simulate bidding behavior in a 
buyback program for large vessel permits throughout the Gulf of Mexico using both a SB 
and OTB auction.  With these simulations it is possible to compare the cost and 
effectiveness of each. The speculative premium is the key variable in this chapter as it  
 
                                                 
44 Further background on the Texas Program can be found in the third chapter of this dissertation as well as 
Funk et al. (2003). 
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establishes a behavioral relationship between the value that a fisherman attaches to their 
license and the bids that he or she will offer for the sale of that asset.   
A GBFSM Introduction 
To conduct the simulations necessary for this study I developed a policy module 
which operates inside of the General Bioeconomic Fisheries Simulation Model 
(GBFSM).  GBFSM has been discussed at length in the fisheries economic literature and 
a detailed discussion of the model is beyond the scope of the current analysis.  In this 
section we will provide a very general overview of GBFSM and discuss the placement of 
the Gulf of Mexico license buyback module within the overall structure.  For a more 
detailed discussion of GBFSM the reader should consult Grant and Griffin (1979) and 
Grant, Isakson, and Griffin (1981).    
GBFSM is a multi-species, bioeconomic simulation model developed by Dr. 
Wade Griffin.  A summary of the major functionality of the simulation model is provided 
in the GBFSM manual: 
The biological sub-model represents the recruitment of new organisms 
into the fishery by species, sex, and fishing area. Recruitment may be in 
one or all depth zones, and movement may be to greater or lesser depths 
and between fishing areas. Organisms grow and move from one size class 
to another, and mortality results from both natural causes and fishing… 
… The economic submodel represents the fishing effort (nominal days 
fished converted to real days fished) exerted on each species and on by-
catch. Monetary costs of fishing, value of harvest, and rent to the fishery 
are calculated. 
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Fleets 
This simulation model divides the Gulf of Mexico into four regions as shown 
below in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1 
 Four Gulf Regions of Shrimp Landings in the General Bioeconomic Fisheries 
Simulation Model 45 
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 
Florida Alabama46, 
Mississippi, & 
Eastern Louisiana 
Western 
Louisiana 
Texas 
 
 
Each region includes two vessel classes: vessels less than 60 feet in length and 
vessels 60 feet or greater in length.  In the model, small vessels (those less than 60 feet) 
generally shrimp in inshore areas in state waters and offshore state waters.47  Large 
vessels shrimp both in offshore state waters and federal waters, including the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ).  The model is calibrated so that the initial size of each large 
vessel fleet is equal to the number of federal permits requested from each region in 2005.  
                                                 
45 Regions are where shrimp are landed and areas are where shrimp are caught.  Areas are adjacent to each 
region.  It is assumed that vessels land fish in only one region but can catch fish in any of the four areas 
where shrimp are caught. 
46 In the results section of this chapter I will refer to each region by its proper name.  For example, I will 
refer to “Texas” instead of “region 4.”  As a convenience to the reader however, I will refer to region 2 as 
“East Gulf.” 
47 There are only a few small vessels that have permits to fish in federal waters, however for convienence it 
is assumed that small vessels do not have permits. 
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An important assumption of the model is that large vessels selling back their federal 
permits do not continue fishing in offshore areas in state waters48. 
Finally, it deserves mention that GBFSM is a homogenous fleet model.  Revenue 
and cost figures are calculated by region and vessel class.  This means that all vessels 
within a particular fleet are treated as if they have the same revenue and cost structure.   
The buyback policy module works in four basic steps.  First, using the estimated 
speculative premium in the SB program and fishery rents, which are calculated in 
GBFSM’s economic submodel, the distribution of bids that will be submitted to the 
auction in a given year is predicted.  Next, the budget determines how many of these bids 
can be accepted.  The size of the fleet is then adjusted to reflect the number of licenses or 
permits exiting the fishery due to the buyout.  Finally, effort in days fished is adjusted 
according to the new fleet size.  The next section will explore these steps individually. 
The GBFSM Buyback Policy Module 
  The buyback policy module was written in Fortran 90 for this analysis and 
functions as one of several GBFSM policy options.  The module operates inside of 
GBFSM and uses information obtained from GBFSM’s biological and economic 
submodels, along with data from outside the model, in order to simulate the effects of 
different buyback programs.  This section discusses the details of the buyback policy 
module. 
                                                 
48 From personal communication with Mike Travis of NMFS I understand that it would not be 
economically viable for large vessels to operate without access to the EEZ.  Therefore, I believe it is 
reasonable to assume that large vessels forfeiting their federal permits are not continuing to shrimp in 
offshore state waters. 
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Data 
The data required of GBFSM for our simulations can be broken into two classes.  
The first class of data provides the policy module with a complete description of the 
programs it must simulate.  The second class of data deals with parameters estimates and 
other data obtained from outside of GBFSM and used by the buyback policy submodel. 
The program description data starts with a specification of the number of 
programs to be simulated.  Next, the region/vessel class combinations eligible to 
participate in each program must be defined.  Then each program is assigned a type 
(either sequential or one-time).  Finally, the total budget for each program is declared. 
The second class of data includes estimated values from outside the simulation model.  
The first of these is the speculative premium.  This value can be calculated using the 
parameters of the function estimated in Chapter IV for each region, vessel class, and 
year.  Next, the actual number of vessels in each region/vessel class combination must be 
input. 
Initial Values 
GBFSM is set up to analyze percent changes in fleet size.  The simulation model 
treats each region as if it were initially composed of 100 representative vessels.  For the 
offshore fisheries, the buyback policy module keeps track of the representative fleet 
(percent of original vessels) in each year as well as the actual fleet and this translates into 
a corresponding percentage reduction in the total effort available to fish in each region.  
For the inshore fisheries, the model only tracks percentage changes in each fleet.  I do 
not track changes in actual vessels for the inshore fisheries because of the lack of reliable 
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data on the number of inshore vessels for each region.  However, the absence of actual 
vessel numbers for the inshore fisheries should not qualitatively limit the analysis.   
Because offshore fishing in state waters is a relatively minor part of the fishery, 
in all of the analysis in this chapter it is assumed that any program that retires the federal 
permits will effectively also retire the state off-shore license.  No program explicitly for 
state offshore fishing is modeled.  In the model, vessels are assumed to land shrimp in a 
single region.  For calibration, individual vessels are not identified, so there is a one-to-
one relationship between the landings in the region and the vessels.   
Predicted Bids 
The first major task carried out in the buyback policy submodel of GBFSM is to 
determine a distribution of bids for each fleet.  Bids are determined based on the 
profitability of the fishery and type of buyback under analysis.  To present this 
calculation completely it will be informative to back-up and briefly discuss order of 
operations. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the important steps to understand for this analysis.  When a 
simulation run begins, the model initializes several key variables, including fleet size.  
The simulation then runs through the biological submodel, which calculates recruitment, 
mortality, and other important biological relationships.  Once the biological variables are 
calculated, the simulation then calculates economic variables such as cost and fisheries 
rents.  Of particular interest for this analysis are fishery revenues and the cost structure.  
After calculating the key economic variables, the simulation enters the license buyback 
submodel.   
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Figure 5.1. An Illustration of the General Bioeconomic Fisheries Simulation Model 
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In a given year, the model enters the buyback policy module with values for the 
crucial variables, fleet size and net revenue.  To predict the bids that will be submitted 
for license buyout in a SB auction I use the net revenue combined with the estimated 
value of the speculative premium.  And to predict bids in a OTB auction I use the present 
value of net revenues.  Net revenues are defined as revenues net of all variable costs.  
 From the econometric model discussed in Chapter IV we have estimates for the 
speculative component.  The following details how the estimates of speculation are used 
to predict bids for the simulation model.  
Denote the benefit function for an individual with vessel length x facing price p 
as R(x,p) and the optimal bid as b* then the speculative ratio for vessel length x in time t 
is, 
.
),(
*),(
tpxR
btxspecratio   
This ratio is used to calculate the average bid for a vessel class for the SB programs in 
the license buyback submodel. 
At the point in the overall simulation when the program enters the buyback policy 
module, a value for net revenue by region and by vessel class has already been 
calculated.  Under the assumption that revenues and costs are distributed evenly 
throughout the fleet the expected net revenue for individual i can be calculated as, 
.
),(
),(
classvesselregionfleet
classvesselregionnetrevenuenetrevenuei   
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In a OTB auction theory suggests that an individual’s minimum willingness to 
accept payment for a license will be the present value of that asset.  So for the OTB 
auction the average bid is calculated as,  
,  where  the discount factor.
1
OTB i
i
netrevenue
bid    
In the SB auction however the average bid will contain a speculative component.  
We calculate the average bid for the SB auction as, 
* (1 ).
1
SB i
i i
netrevenuebid specratio   
The average bid shown above is the bid per vessel for each region and vessel 
class.  This is converted to a bid per percent of the fleet by adjusting the per vessel bid by 
the ratio of actual vessels to representative units.   
Once the mean bid per percent of the fleet has been calculated, bids for the 
vessels in that fleet are determined by generating a distribution around the average as 
follows.  I assume that bids from the fleet will be distributed logistically around the 
average bid, which gives a closed form expression for the cumulative density function 
(cdf), 
k
mb
e
bD )(
1
1)( 

 . 
Here, the parameter m represents the mean of the distribution and k is a distributional 
parameter related to the variance (the parameter k is defined below).  
With this assumption about the distribution of the bids, it is possible to calculate 
the bid at a given percentile of the fleet, p, by inverting the cdf, 
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   ln 1b m k p p   .49 (5.1) 
The parameter k defines the standard deviation of the distribution as follows 
3.14159.where
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The variance, 2, is estimated based on data from the TPWD program as is discussed in 
section entitled “Bidding Assumptions” below. 
Table 5.2 shows a sample distribution for a fleet with 100 vessels.  Here the 
average bid is $10,000 and standard deviation is $3,000.  The table shows predicted bids 
from this fleet. 
Bid Acceptance 
Once the distribution for bids submitted to the buyback auction has been 
simulated, we must determine what percent of the fleet can be purchased.  In the 
simulations this decision is based on available funds (recall that the funds available are 
exogenous and predetermined).  The simulation model can accommodate a variety of 
different combinations of region and vessel classes eligible to participate in the program 
and one or several programs can be operating simultaneously.  For example, it is possible 
to simulate one program for the entire gulf or a program for each region in the gulf.  Each 
region-vessel class combination in a program is called a group and for each group there 
                                                 
49 For example, the 90th percentile, p=0.9, would refer to the vessel whose bid is higher than 90% of the 
bids in the fleet. 
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is a separate distribution of bids.  The bids from all groups in a program are sorted from 
lowest to highest and the lowest bids are accepted until the available funds are exhausted.   
 
Table 5.2 
 Sample of a Simulated Distribution of Bids 
Vessel P 
Bid50 



 
p
pkmb 1ln  
1 0.01 $2,399.73 
2 0.02 $3,562.98 
3 0.03 $4,250.58 
4 0.04 $4,743.54 
5 0.05 $5,129.94 
6 0.06 $5,449.00 
7 0.07 $5,721.65 
8 0.08 $5,960.39 
9 0.09 $6,173.28 
10 0.1 $6,365.82 
    
98 0.98 $16,437.02 
99 0.99 $17,600.27 
 
 
To provide an example of the bid/buyout portion of the algorithm, suppose one 
wanted to simulate the capacity reduction achieved by extending the current Texas 
program (call this program 1) and also adding a buyback program for all large, federally 
permitted vessels in the gulf (call this program 2).  The current Texas program applies 
only to the Texas Bay System, therefore, this program would have one group (Region  
                                                 
50 Bid, as used here, is defined in equation 5.1. 
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4/vessel class 1).  The second program, operating in the gulf, would have 4 groups 
(Region 1/vessel class 2, Region 2/vessel class 2, Region 3/vessel class 2, and Region  
4/vessel class 2).   
For program 1 the buyout process is simple.  The simulated distribution gives a 
dollar amount at each percent of the fleet that is required to buyout that percent.  With 
only one group in the program one could simply integrate along this distribution until the 
budget is exhausted.   
For program 2, however, the buyout process is more complex.  With 4 groups 
eligible to participate there are 4 separate distributions of bids.  The model will pool 
these bids and sort them in ascending order.  It will then begin purchasing the cheapest 
license until the budget is spent.  It is interesting to note here that with this type of 
program it is possible to have regions from which no licenses are purchased.     
Fleet/Effort Updating 
The last step in the buyback module is to update the fleets and return these values 
back to the main GBFSM model for use in the next time step.  After the bid acceptance 
portion of the buyback module is complete we know the percent of each fleet that was 
bought out via the simulated programs.  The fleet is then adjusted by this percent. Fleet 
updating is a simple matter of multiplying the fleet at the beginning of the year by one 
minus the percent reduction.  Likewise, effort, measured in days-fished, is adjusted by 
the percent change in the fleet. 
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Important Assumptions of the Simulation Model 
The simulation model in general and the policy module in particular impose some 
important limitations on the results.  It is important to be transparent about these in order 
for the reader to understand what this model is and is not capable of analyzing.  What I 
believe to be the most important assumptions underlying our model are discussed 
below.51 
Unit Costs and Prices 
One important assumption relating to the fleet rent function is that unit prices 
within a size category and unit costs are unchanging.  The model holds prices and unit 
costs constant at 2005 levels throughout the 10-year simulation.  This is an important 
assumption because as licenses are bought back capacity leaves the fleet, which may 
affect shrimp supply.  One possible effect of this shift in the supply curve is higher 
shrimp prices.  This movement is not captured in our model.52   
Bidding Assumptions 
In applying the bidding distribution there are two assumptions that deserve some 
discussion.  This first is that there exists a minimum price, below which nobody will bid 
regardless of rents.  The second is that the standard deviation of the distribution is 
declining through time. 
                                                 
51 A discussion of the assumptions that are maintained in GBFSM can be found at the GBFSM website: 
http://agecon2.tamu.edu/people/faculty/griffin-wade/gbfsm/ 
52 It should be noted however that prices do rise during the 10-year simulation.  The price rise is due to a 
rise in the average size of shrimp harvested as effort decreases.  Since prices are positively related to 
shrimp size, average shrimp price does rise over the 10-year simulation. 
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The assumption of a minimum bid stems from the estimation work and is 
empirically justified.  The estimation of the bid function for Texas fishermen includes a 
variable for the minimum point in the bidder’s subjective expected grant distribution.  
This is the lowest value for which bidders in that auction believe the probability of  
having the agency accept their bid is 1.  In this study the value is captured by the variable 
PLoStart, which is a variable to be estimated.  This variable is the first prior expectation 
over the lowest point in the grant distribution.  The estimate of this variable (from 
Chapter IV) was $1,000.  This suggests that bidders in the Texas auction who have, as of 
yet, no knowledge of prices paid for licenses are behaving as though $1,000 is the 
minimum license price.   
In order to use this estimate to inform the simulations, it is converted to a bid per 
unit length figure then multiplied by a factor representing each region’s rents in relation 
to Texas.  The data from the Texas program included bidding behavior almost 
exclusively from small inshore vessels.  Since the simulations in this chapter deal with 
large offshore vessels, the observed bid floor was converted to a bid floor in terms of 
dollars per foot of vessel length by scaling up.  The bid floor is applied to large vessels 
by multiplying by 60, the lower bound for length of large boats in GBFSM.  The regional 
rent factor is calculated simply as the ratio of fishery returns in region i to fishery returns 
in Texas.  This is meant to try and capture some of the regional differences in bidding 
that may arise because of differing economic conditions. 
Another key component of the calculation of the distribution of bid is the 
standard deviation.  I have shown that over time the distribution of the bids from the 
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Texas auction condensed considerably.  Over the life of that auction the standard 
deviation in the distribution of bids went from around $20,000 down to $6,000.  I use 
this trend in the standard deviation for the Texas auction to help form assumptions about 
the standard deviations for the simulated bid distributions. 
At $20,000 the standard deviation in the Texas inshore auction is about 5.3 times 
the average bid in that auction.  This deviation declines by an average of 7% per year 
through the 8th year.  Therefore, in the first period of each simulation the standard 
deviation of the bidding distribution in each region is set equal to 5 times the average bid 
for that region.  For each year thereafter, the standard deviations decline by 7%.  It is 
assumed that by the 8th year learning is complete and the standard deviation in the 
bidding distribution does not change. 
Participation 
In the Texas Inshore Shrimp License Buyback Program, in each year, only a 
small percent of the total licenses in the fishery are bid on.  In 1997 only 18% of the 
licenses eligible for buyback were bid on.  In particular, as described in Chapter III, the 
participation decision seems to be significantly influenced by the age of the license 
holder and length of the licensed vessel.  Because of the homogeneous fleet structure, the 
simulation model is not able to incorporate these factors.  Hence, it is assumed that in 
each period there will be a bid for each license in the fishery.   
This assumption will likely have an impact on the distribution of bids across 
regions.  In Chapter III I showed that demographic factors have an influence on the bids 
and the participation decisions, and that these factors will differ between regions.  
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Specifically, if age could be incorporated into the calculation of bids the predictions 
would likely be more accurate.   
Bid Grant/Acceptance 
For the SB auction run by Texas Parks and Wildlife the decision to grant or reject 
a particular bid is a complicated one.  Bids are ranked based on the size of the bid and the 
agency’s estimate of that vessel’s effort, which was based on vessel length53.  The bids 
that result in the largest effort retirement per dollar spent are ranked highest and granted 
first.  This analysis assumes simply that bids are granted in order from lowest to highest 
until the budget is exhausted.  
I also make an important assumption regarding the fisherman’s acceptance of 
buyout offers.  In the Texas program after having a bid granted the license holder may 
choose whether to accept the offer.  This creates a unique decision making environment 
where the bidder potentially has the ability to bid “too low” without penalty.  The 
estimates of parameters of the bidding function from Chapter IV were derived under the 
assumption that once a bid is granted the license is retired.  Although this is not strictly 
accurate, the number of bidders who actually rejected a bid once granted is small, 
suggesting that most bids are offered on the assumption that if granted they will be 
accepted and their licenses will be retired.  This assumption is carried over to the policy 
simulations as well.  This assumption should not significantly impact our ability to 
compare the two auction designs.   
                                                 
53 Through personal communication with Robin Riechers of TPWD I learned that the formula for ranking 
bids originally included vessel length and number of years the owner has been in the fishery.  The formula 
was amended early on to rank bids primarily on vessel length. 
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Scenario Analysis 
The focus of this chapter is on using GBFSM to compare the effectiveness of SB 
programs relative to OTBs.  This comparison is carried out by seeking to answer two 
important questions.  First, what would be the effects of instituting in the entire Gulf of 
Mexico a SB program similar to the one used to buyback licenses in the Texas Inshore 
Shrimp fishery? And second, how would the costs and effectiveness of this proposed 
policy differ if, a OTB auction were used to buyback licenses? 
Baseline 
The Baseline Scenario assumes that Texas keeps its inshore license buyback 
program, that there is open access for all small vessels in the gulf and limited entry for 
large vessels in the gulf.  This is a reasonably accurate depiction of current regulations in 
the Gulf of Mexico’s shrimp fisheries.  Large vessels operating in federal waters in each 
region are currently subject to limited entry while small vessels operating inshore and 
near shore are not.  Moreover, the Texas buyback program is entering its 12th year with 
no plans to end.54 
Scenario 1: Gulf-wide SB  
In Scenario 1 I still consider open access for small vessels in the gulf and a SB 
operating for small vessels in Texas but I add a SB program for large vessels in all gulf 
                                                 
54 After completing the analysis I learned that the Texas program is being brought to a conclusion (personal 
communication, Robin Riechers).  Because of the relatively small size of this fishery I believe that halting 
this program would not significantly alter the simulation results. 
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regions.  This scenario explores the effects of extending a program like the one used to 
retire licenses in Texas to federal waters in the Gulf of Mexico.   
This scenario imposes two buyback programs.  The first program applies to one 
group which includes Texas small vessels only.  The second program applies to 4 groups 
which include large vessels in each of the four regions. 
Scenario 2: Gulf-wide OTB 
Scenario 2 explores what would happen if a OTB were used in Scenario 1 instead 
of a SB auction.  It again considers open access for small vessels in the gulf and a 
continuation of the Texas program but it adds a OTB program for federal waters in the 
Gulf of Mexico. 
Scenario 3: Multiple Regional SB Programs 
This scenario is similar to Scenario 1, but instead of including large vessel from 
the four gulf regions in a single program, four programs are specified for large vessels.  
Here I explore the impact of allowing each region a budget for large vessel buyout.  
Scenario 3 includes five programs and each program applies to only one group.  The first 
program is a SB program for Texas small vessels.  Programs 2 – 5 are SB programs for 
large vessels in each of the four gulf regions. 
Scenario 4: Multiple Regional OTB Programs 
Scenario 4 explores what would happen if a OTB auction were used in Scenario 3 
instead of a SB auction.  It again considers open access for small vessels in the gulf and a 
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continuation of the Texas program but it adds multiple regional OTB programs for large 
vessels in each of the four regions. 
Results55 
Fleet reductions achieved via buyback programs produce both biological and 
economic benefits for the fishery.  Because biological effects often impact the economics 
as well, it is informative to further subdivide these effects into stock effects, price effects, 
and cost effects.   
Removing capital and decreasing competition among resource users may affect 
the size and abundance of the resource stock.  Less harvesting pressure on the stock 
allows shrimp to reach a larger size.  Because larger shrimp generally fetch higher prices 
the buyout may increase the value of landings.  A buyout will also have a fleet 
rationalization effect which provides economic benefits for the fishery.  With a buyback 
in place, the least profitable producers will be the ones most eager to sell their licenses.  
With these relatively high cost producers purged from the fleet the result is a streamlined 
fleet with a more favorable revenue/cost relationship.   
In this section I will focus on concise measures of program success, which 
include not only biological and economic benefits but costs as well.  In the following 
section I present the results of our policy simulations.  The key outputs will be permit 
reductions, average permit price, landings, effort, the effects of these changes on fishery  
                                                 
55  The results in this chapter are based on an early version of the simulation model.  The model has since 
been recalibrated.  Interested readers may consult Woodward and Griffin (2008) for an updated results 
derived from the final parameterized model.  
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rents, and cost.  The results indicate that OTB programs are capable of retiring permits at 
a much lower cost than SB programs.  Because of this, OTB auctions are able to retire 
more licenses and generate greater rents for the fisheries then the SB programs.  
Baseline 
The Baseline Scenario is the current status quo for the Gulf of Mexico shrimp 
fisheries and the base year for our simulations in 2005.  The baseline assumes that Texas 
keeps its sequential buyback program for the inshore fishery, that offshore fisheries in 
the other four regions have limited entry, and that there is no limited entry for the small 
vessels in W.LA, AL-MS-E.LA, and FL.   
Table 5.3 provides a summary of fleet and rent changes over the 10-year 
simulation run for large vessels.  From the table one can see that, even in the absence of a 
buyback program, there are noticeable large vessel fleet reductions in each region.  This 
attrition can be explained by the negative rents present in each fishery initially.  
However, referring to the ending rents column, one can see that these reductions were 
only sufficient to generate positive rents in two of the four fisheries.  This suggests that, 
although there are fleet reductions without instituting any buyback programs, there is 
room for improvement. 
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Table 5.3 
 Baseline Scenario Results for Large Vessels  
  Fleet (Vessels) Rents ($1,000s) 
  
Initial 
Fleet 
Ending 
Fleet 
Percent 
Reduction Initial Ending Change 
FL 627 444 29.16 -$6,640 -$392 $6,247 
AL-MS-
E.LA 1233 1071 13.17 -$15,717 -$2,237 $13,480 
W.LA 588 447 23.90 -$16,987 $3,904 $20,891 
TX 1497 1031 30.7 -$40,150 $724 $40,874 
 
 
Table 5.4 provides a summary of the Baseline Scenario for small vessels.  Like 
the large vessel fleets, we see that rents are initially negative for each small vessel fleet.  
However, the fleet reductions resulting from this state are much greater than the 
reductions in the large vessel fleets.  From the table we can see that conditions in the 
small vessel fisheries are extremely poor.  Positive rents arise in Western Louisiana and 
Alabama-Mississippi-Eastern Louisiana only after 30 and 49% of the respective fleets 
have exited.  Moreover, the rents for Florida and Texas small vessels remain negative 
even after 99 and 70% of the respective fleets have left the fishery.  
 
 134
Table 5.4 
 Baseline Scenario Results for Small Vessels  
 Fleet Rents ($1,000s) 
  
Initial 
Fleet 
Ending 
Fleet 
Percent 
Reduction Initial Ending Change 
FL 100% 1.17% 98.83 -$1,185 -$10 $1,175 
AL-MS-E.LA 100% 69.91% 30.09 -$3,527 $349 $3,876 
W.LA 100% 51.13% 48.87 -$9,869 $2,084 $11,953
TX 100% 28.57% 71.43 -$7,950 -$1,802 $6,148 
 
Table 5.5 shows a summary of the change in landings and catch per unit of effort 
(CPUE) under the Baseline Scenario for the large vessel fleets included in the 
simulations.  Here one can see very large changes in landings for the small vessel fleets 
(especially in Florida and Texas), while changes in landings for large vessel fleets are 
much less drastic.  Conversely, the increases in the CPUE are greater for large vessel 
than small because a reduction in small vessel harvests benefits large vessels as shrimp 
are able to migrate to offshore waters. 
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Table 5.5 
Baseline Landings and Catch per Unit Effort Summary for Large Gulf Vessels 
 Landings (1,000 lbs) CPUE (lbs/day fished) 
  Initial Ending 
% 
Change Initial Ending 
% 
Change 
FL 7,771.64 6,885.70 -11.4 743.84 937.85 26.08
AL-MS-E.LA 20,224.96 21,572.69 6.66 1,162.56 1,437.03 23.61
W.LA 27,259.19 27,783.31 1.92 1,154.56 1,546.18 33.92
TX 43,625.14 39,977.23 -8.36 1,066.24 1,410.83 32.32
 
 
Scenario 1: Gulfwide SB Program 
I now present several policies options that will be compared with the baseline 
presented above.  The first policy scenario is that of a single gulfwide SB program for 
large vessels in addition to the SB program in effect for Texas small vessels.  The large 
vessel SB program applies to all regions and we assume a budget of $4 million per year.  
This budget is chosen arbitrarily, but the qualitative properties of the results would not 
change much if the program were scaled up or down depending on the resources 
available.   
Table 5.6 provides a snapshot of important results of the large vessel SB 
program.  The program retired 40% of the original capacity, a 20% improvement over 
the baseline reductions.  Although landings and effort both dropped, the former fell less 
than the latter and CPUE rose by 35% over the 10-year simulation horizon.  Finally, the 
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fleet rationalization achieved by this program prompted an $88.8 million increase in 
fishery rents. 
 
 Table 5.6  
 Gulfwide Sequential Buyback Snapshot (Large Gulf Vessels) 
  Vessels 
Landings  
(1,000 lbs) 
Effort  (1,000 
Days-Fished 
CPUE  
(Lbs/Day-
Fished) 
Rents  
($1,000) 
Initial 3945 98,880.96 92.37 1,070.49 -$79,493
Ending 2402 84,475.94 58.18 1,451.98 $9,375
% Change -39.10 -14.57 -37.01 35.64 
 
 
As a concise measure of the costs and benefits of this SB program the rents 
generated by the program are shown in Table 5.7.  From the table one can see that in 
years 2 and 3 total gulf rents remain negative.  In the fourth year the program starts to 
payoff in the form of positive fishery rents.  The total cost of the program in present 
value terms (using a 7% discount rate) is about $28 million.  In comparison, the sum of 
the present value of total gulf rents in years 2 – 10 is about $28 million.  This is a $38 
million improvement over the Baseline Scenario, giving a return on investment for the 
gulfwide SB program of $1.85 for every dollars spent. 
Scenario 2: Gulfwide OTB program 
Scenario 2 simulates the effects of a gulfwide OTB program for large vessels in 
addition to the SB program for Texas small vessels.  This policy scenario differs from 
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Scenario 1 only in the type of auction used for the large vessel buyback.  In this section I 
present the effects of a OTB program on the Gulf of Mexico’s offshore shrimp fishery. 
Table 5.8 provides a summary of results from this simulation.  The OTB program 
was able to cut the offshore fleet by 61%, increasing fishery rents to $27 million by the 
10th year.  The fleet reductions pushed CPUE up by 52%.  These fleet reductions 
represent a substantial improvement over the baseline reduction of 24%.  Additionally, 
the increase in CPUE is a significant improvement over the 30% increase in CPUE under 
the Baseline Scenario. 
 
Table 5.7  
Gulfwide Sequential Buyback Annual Rents (7% Discount Rate) 
Year Vessels 
PV Rents 
($1,000s) 
1 3,945 -$79,493.36 
2 3,451 -$30,536.90 
3 3,138 -$7,844.48 
4 2,829 $837.17 
5 2,688 $3,935.23 
6 2,629 $4,633.87 
7 2,562 $5,004.71 
8 2,503 $5,212.96 
9 2,453 $5,244.03 
10 2,418 $5,099.47 
11 2,402  
Total 
(Relative to 
Baseline)  
$38,364.00  
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Table 5.8 
 Gulfwide One-time Buyback Snapshot (Large Gulf Vessels) 
  Vessels 
Effort (1,000 
Days Fished) 
Landings 
(1,000 lbs) CPUE 
Rents 
($1,000) 
Initial 3,945 92.37 98,880.96 1,070.49 -$79,493 
Ending  
(year 10) 1,547 35.84 58,574.33 1,634.74 $26,898 
% Change -60.79 -61.20 -35.71 52.70  
  
 
Table 5.9 illustrates the present value of the stream of rents generated by the 
gulfwide OTB program.  The budget for this program is a single payment of $28 million.  
The reductions afforded by the gulfwide OTB program generate over $92 million in total 
rents, a huge improvement over the Baseline Scenario, which resulted in a $126 million 
loss for the fishery.   Relative to the status quo, the gulfwide OTB program has a 
rent/cost ratio of $7.79 meaning that for each dollar spent the gulfwide program, there 
was a $7.79 increase in rents relative to the the status quo. 
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Table 5.9 
 Gulfwide One-time Buyback Rents 
Year Vessels 
PV Rents 
($1,000) 
1 3,945 -$79,493.36
2 1,614 $10,748.01
3 1,614 $26,154.39
4 1,550 $24,510.75
5 1,547 $22,476.58
6 1,547 $20,622.35
7 1,547 $18,944.27
8 1,547 $17,343.94
9 1,547 $15,918.41
10 1,547 $14,630.77
Total 
(Relative to 
Base)  $218,12756
 
 
Comparison: Scenario 1 vs. Scenario 2 
From the tables presented in the previous sections it is clear that Scenarios 1 and 
2 offer an improvement over the Baseline.  Here we compare the policy options to one 
another using total permit reductions, change in rents, change in CPUE, and average 
cost. 
Table 5.10 summarizes the important changes to the offshore fishery from the 
two simulated policy options.  From the table it is immediately clear that the OTB 
auction was able to retire more capacity at a lower unit price.  As a result of the superior 
                                                 
56 The program generated a total present value stream of rents of $92 million.  Since the baseline scenario 
resulted in a present value stream of rents of -$126 million, the $92 million generated by the Gulfwide 
OTB is a $218 million improvement.  
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capacity reductions, the OTB program improved productivity in the fishery by a much 
greater margin, pushing catch per unit of effort up by an additional  182.76 pounds per 
day fished. 
 
Table 5.10 
Gulfwide Sequential and One-time Buyback Auction Comparison 
 
Fleet 
Reductions Cost ($1,000) 
Avg. Permit 
Price 
($1,000) 
CPUE 
Change 
(lbs/unit 
effort) 
SB 1,543 $28,094  $26  381.49 
OTB 2,398 $28,094  $12  564.25 
 
Speculative Premium and Permit Prices 
In the previous chapter I explored the role of learning in the SB auction and 
found that this type of auction leads bidders to attach a speculative premium to their bid.  
This speculation, and the dynamic purchasing of the SB auction in general, creates some 
interesting differences in prices between the SB and OTB auctions.  Table 5.10 shows a 
permit price difference between the SB and OTB auctions of around $14,000, when 
calculated as total reductions divided by total cost.  However, average permit prices by 
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round for the sequential auction shows a much larger discrepancies between the two 
auction formats.  Table 5.11 shows the average price by round for the SB program.     
 
Table 5.11 
 Gulfwide Sequential Buyback Auction, Average Price by Round 
Year Vessels Reductions
Avg. Price  
($1,000s) 
1 3,945   
2 3,451 494 $8.10 
3 3,138 313 $12.78 
4 2,829 309 $12.93 
5 2,688 141 $28.35 
6 2,629 59 $67.73 
7 2,562 67 $59.84 
8 2,503 59 $68.03 
9 2,453 50 $79.97 
10 2,418 35 $115.34 
11 2,402 16 $252.53 
 
 
From Table 5.11 it is clear that the SB auction pays a large premium for permits 
in later rounds.  The bulk of the reductions for this scenario are concentrated in periods 
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during which the fishery is losing money, resulting in low buyout prices and a relatively 
low overall average permit price.  However, as the auction progresses and capacity is 
retired, permit prices begin to rise sharply.   
The speculative premium has a compounding effect on permit prices in the SB 
program.  The average simulated bid in any year is based on the net revenues in the 
fishery.  As the fishery becomes more profitable, the average bid for the fleet rises.  The 
speculative component also rises through time reflecting the improved state of the 
fishery.  So, as vessels are removed from the fishery, we note two effects on the 
distribution of bids.  The first is that the average simulated bid is rising as a function of 
increased profitability.  The second is that the speculative component is rising in 
conjunction with rising rents.  These two effects lead to some extremely high permit 
prices in the later years of our simulation. 
Regional Simulations  
In addition to the two gulfwide scenarios, two regional scenarios were simulated.  
In Scenarios 3 and 4, I simulate separate buyback programs for large vessels in each of 
the four gulf regions.  For comparative purposes the total budget of $4 million annually 
is used here just as in the gulfwide programs.  However, the budget is allocated to each 
region based on its share of total gulf effort in the initial period.  Allocation in this 
manner is only one of many reasonable ways by which the budget might be divided up 
between the regions and I am not advocating this approach over any other.   Though 
quantitatively the results would vary depending on the allocation rule, I believe that the 
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qualitative features of these results would be reasonably robust to different allocation 
rules. 
Aggregate Effects 
This section compares the regional programs with their gulfwide counterparts.  
The main metrics for comparison are fleet reductions, change in CPUE and change in 
fishery rents.  In the previous discussion of the gulfwide programs, I explored how these 
programs affect the gulf as a whole.  In this section results will also be aggregated in 
order to compare them to gulfwide results. 
Table 5.12 summarizes the results of the regional and gulfwide SB programs.  
From the table, one can see that the gulfwide SB program categorically dominates its 
regional counterpart.  Because the gulfwide program seeks out the cheapest permits 
throughout the gulf, it is able to achieve much greater fleet reductions than the regional 
program.  As a result the gulfwide program offers greater increases in both fishery rents 
and CPUE. 
A particularly interesting fact regarding the comparison of the gulfwide and 
regional SB programs is that, although the regional program targets effort, the gulfwide 
program actually resulted in a greater effort reduction.  This is due in part to the fact that 
the region responsible for the greatest portion of total gulf effort (Texas) is also the 
region with the cheapest permits initially.  So, while the regional SB program allocates 
44% of the $4 million budget to buy out permits in Texas, there are so many cheap 
permits in Texas that the gulfwide program spends all $4 million in this region in the first 
year.   
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Table 5.12 
 Aggregate Effects - Regional Sequential Buyback vs. Gulfwide Sequential Buyback 
Programs 
 Gulfwide SB Regional SB 
  Vessels CPUE 
Rents 
($1,000) Vessels CPUE 
Rents 
($1,000) 
Initial 3,945 1,070.49 -$79,493 3,945 1,070.49 -$79,493
Ending 2,402 1,452 9,375 2,562 1,435.60 $8,654 
% 
Change -39.1 35.64 -35.06 34.1 
 
 
Table 5.13 shows the impact of the regional and gulfwide SB programs on fishery 
rents over the 10-year simulation.  From the table, three interesting effects of fleet 
reductions on the aggregate rent function are visible.  The first is a timing effect.  The 
gulfwide program retires more vessels faster, which has a profound impact on fishery 
rents.  Next, there is a declining marginal impact of fleet reductions on the rent function 
illustrated in Table 5.13.  From years 1 to 2, the change in rents with respect to the 
change in vessels (measured in thousands of dollars) was -$94.8 for the gulfwide 
program and -$98.8 for the regional program.  By year 10 in the simulation, the fleet 
level under the gulfwide SB program is such that the change in rents with respect to fleet 
is -$10.5.  This illustrates the declining marginal value of fleet reductions.  Finally, there 
is a geographic effect of fleet reductions on aggregate rents that deserves mention.  
Because the gulfwide program targets the cheapest permits in each year, it makes very 
few reductions to the fleet in Western Louisiana.    
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Table 5.13 also shows the total present value of rents generated by the regional 
SB and gulfwide SB programs.  With these totals we can calculate a rent/cost ratio of 
$0.85 for the regional SB program and $1.37 for the gulfwide SB program.  In short, 
relative to the status quo, each dollar spent in the gulfwide program generates $1.37 more 
in rents in the fishery, while the regional program generates $0.85. 
 
Table 5.13 
 Rents Under Sequential Buyback Programs 
 Gulfwide SB Regional SB 
Year Fleet 
Rents 
($1,000) 
PV Rents 
($1,000) Fleet 
Rents 
($1,000) 
PV Rents 
($1,000) 
1 3,945 -$79,493 -$79,493 3945 -$79,493 -$79,493 
2 3,451 -$32,674 -$30,537 3488 -$34,271 -$32,029 
3 3,138 -$8,981 -$7,844 3243 -$11,453 -$10,003 
4 2,829 $1,026  $837  3001 -$2,703 -$2,206 
5 2,688 $5,158  $3,935  2869 $1,600  $1,221  
6 2,629 $6,499  $4,634  2793 $3,773  $2,690  
7 2,562 $7,511  $5,005  2717 $5,673  $3,780  
8 2,503 $8,371  $5,213  2663 $6,956  $4,332  
9 2,453 $9,010  $5,244  2608 $8,098  $4,713  
10 2,418 $9,375  $5,099  2578 $8,654  $4,707  
11 2,402           
Total   -$87,907   -$102,289 
Total less 
Baseline  $38,364    $23,981  
 
 
Just as in the SB programs, the gulfwide OTB program was more effective at 
reducing capacity than the regional OTB.  A summary of effects is shown in Table 5.14 
below.  From the table one can see that the gulfwide OTB program retired 84 more 
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vessels than the regional program.  Since the aim of the gulfwide program is to remove 
the most vessels per dollar, it is not surprising to see the gulfwide program dominate its 
regional counterpart in terms of vessel reductions.  Furthermore, because the programs 
are operating with identical budgets the greater fleet reduction under the gulfwide 
program means that this program also paid a lower average price per vessel.  The 
gulfwide program paid $11,715 per permit on average, while the regional OTB program 
paid an average of $12,138 for each permit that it retired. 
The table also shows that the regional OTB program removed more effort than 
the gulfwide program.  This is not unexpected.  Recall that the gulfwide program 
removes the cheapest permits without regard for which region they come from.  The 
regional program distributes the total budget across the regions based on each region’s 
share of total gulf effort in the initial period.  Hence the regional OTB program directs 
larger portions of the total budget to high effort regions.  Although the gulfwide program 
retires more total vessels, the regional OTB program retires more from Texas and 
Western Louisiana.  These two regions collectively are responsible for 70% of total gulf 
effort in the initial period.  Thus, it is not surprising to see greater effort reductions under 
the regional OTB program.   
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Table 5.14 
 Aggregate Effects – Regional One-time Buyback vs. Gulfwide One-Time Buyback Programs 
 Gulfwide OTB Regional OTB 
  Vessels 
Effort 
(1,000 
days 
fished) 
Landings 
(1,000 
lbs) 
CPUE 
(lbs/day 
fished) Vessels 
Effort 
(1,000 
days 
fished) 
Landings 
(1,000 
lbs) 
CPUE 
(lbs/day 
fished) 
Initial 3,945 92.37 98,880.96 1,070.49 3,945 92.37 98,880.96 1,070.49 
Ending 1,547 35.83 58,574.33 1,634.74 1,631 35.00 56,882.34 1,625.35 
% 
Change -60.79 -61.21 -40.76 52.71 -58.67 -62.11 -42.47 51.83 
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The superior effort reductions under the regional program also mean that the 
regional OTB program paid slightly less on average per unit of effort.  The regional 
program paid an average of $489 per unit of effort retired, while the gulfwide program 
paid an average of $496 for each unit of effort it retired. 
It is interesting to note that, although the regional OTB program removed more 
effort than the gulfwide program, the gulfwide OTB actually resulted in a greater 
increase in productivity (as measured by CPUE).  The gulfwide program retired much 
more effort from Florida than the regional program.  Because FL was initially the least 
productive region, the gulfwide program had a greater impact on aggregate productivity 
in the gulf than the regional OTB program. 
Finally, from Table 5.15 below, one can see that the gulfwide program was able 
to generate more rents in the gulf over our 10-year simulation than the regional OTB 
program.  Relative to the Baseline Scenario, the gulfwide program was able to generate 
$7.76 in rents for each dollar spent, while the regional program produced $7.66 in rents 
for each dollar spent. 
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Table 5.15 
 Rent Comparison – Gulfwide One-time Buyback vs. Regional One-Time Buyback 
 Gulfwide OTB Regional OTB 
Year Vessels
PV 
Rents 
($1,000) Vessels 
PV Rents 
($1,000) 
1 3,945 -$79,493 3,945 -$79,493 
2 1,614 $10,748 1,993 $10,228  
3 1,614 $26,154 1,996 $25,740  
4 1,550 $24,511 1,945 $24,162  
5 1,547 $22,477 1,952 $22,179  
6 1,547 $20,622 1,965 $20,342  
7 1,547 $18,944 1,978 $18,668  
8 1,547 $17,344 1,991 $17,133  
9 1,547 $15,918 2,003 $15,727  
10 1,547 $14,631 2,014 $14,430  
Total  $91,856  $89,115  
Total 
Less 
Baseline  $218,127  $215,386  
 
 
Through the comparison of the gulfwide and regional OTB programs I find that 
the gulfwide program retired more vessels and resulted in a lower average cost per 
vessel.  The gulfwide program also resulted in a greater increase in CPUE and generated 
more rents than the regional program.  The regional program did retire more effort and 
resulted in a lower average cost per unit of effort.  This distinction highlights an 
important normative issue:  if the goal of the buyback program is increasing productivity 
and profitability in the fishery then a gulfwide OTB program is the best choice.  
However, if the goal is to retire the most effort for the least cost then the regional OTB 
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program would be preferred.  However, I find that with the budget distributed based on 
the initial levels of effort, the difference between the regional and gulf-wide OTB 
programs is relatively slight.  In contrast, under a SB program, the regional program is 
much less effective than the gulf-wide program.  
Regional Effects  
  The analysis in this chapter has shown that, among SB programs, a gulfwide 
program retires more effort at a lower unit cost, generates more rents for the fishery, and 
increases productivity by a greater margin than a regional SB program.  However, 
among OTB programs, the relative ranking depends on the preferred evaluation criteria. 
Up to this point I have focused the evaluation on the aggregate benefits of each 
program without regard for how these benefits are distributed.  In this section I explore 
program impacts by region and discuss distributional implications.   
Expenditures 
Table 5.16 shows the amount spent in each region by each of the four programs.  
It is evident that the gulfwide SB program spends considerably more in regions 2 and 4 
than in regions 1 and 3.  Interestingly, the gulfwide SB program spends very little money 
at all in Western Louisiana, Region 3.  By design, the regional programs spend 
according to each region’s initial effort level so there are no real surprises in the 
spending patterns for the regional SB and OTB programs.  However, in the gulfwide 
OTB program one again sees that the program spends a disproportionate amount in the 
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East Gulf57 and Texas.  In the following sections I examine changes in CPUE and 
fishery rents by region in order to analyze whether these spending differences are also 
consolidating the benefits of capacity reduction. 
 
 
Table 5.16 
 Expenditures by Region ($1,000s) 
  
Gulfwide 
Sequential 
Buyback 
Regional 
Sequential 
Buyback 
Gulfwide 
One-Time 
Buyback 
Regional 
One-Time 
Buyback 
FL $9,755  $4,522  $4,640  $3,176  
AL-MS-
E.LA $15,381  $7,534  $8,736  $5,292  
W.LA $3,879  $10,225  $4,170  $7,181  
TX $10,985  $17,719  $10,549  $12,445  
                                                 
57 Recall that “East Gulf” refers to the region containing Alabama, Mississippi, and Eastern Louisiana. 
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CPUE Changes by Region 
One of the potential benefits of removing vessels from the fisheries is improved 
productivity as measured by CPUE.  Table 5.17 shows the percent change in CPUE in 
each region, under each of the four programs.  Previously, it was shown that the  
gulfwide programs spend a disproportionate amount of money in Texas and the East 
Gulf .  From the table below one can see that, in Texas at least, this appears to be money 
well spent.  Texas experiences the greatest increase in CPUE under all four of the 
programs. 
Interestingly, the percentage increase in CPUE in the East Gulf is low relative to 
the other regions.  East Gulf has the lowest CPUE increase under all programs 
considered here.  Focusing on the gulfwide SB program, one can see that expenditures 
for East Gulf are much higher than for any other region yet the productivity increase 
there is smaller than in any other region.  The CPUE change is, in fact, the cause of the 
high expenditure level.  Because productivity stays relatively low in East Gulf, permit 
prices remain cheap compared to other regions.  The gulfwide SB program purchases 
more permits from East Gulf than Florida and Western Louisiana combined.  
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Table 5.17  
Change in Catch per Unit Effort by Region (% Change) 
  Gulfwide SB Regional SB 
Gulfwide 
OTB 
Regional 
OTB 
FL 41.49 30.10 57.38 48.23 
AL-MS-
E.LA 28.98 29.30 44.31 43.02 
W.LA 33.50 38.20 52.17 55.44 
TX 35.36 33.93 56.63 60.27 
 
 
Although there are some large differences in spending by region among the four 
simulated programs, Table 5.17 shows that the changes in productivity across regions is 
fairly even within each program.  The largest spread (as measured by the maximum 
increase less the minimum increase) in productivity increase is 17.25% under the 
regional OTB program.  And even under this program the lowest productivity change 
was a 43.02% increase in CPUE. 
Rents 
To determine how rents are distributed across the various regions, I examine the 
rents generated by each program and each region’s share of that total.  Table 5.18 shows 
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the 10-year present value total of rents above the baseline58 generated by each program 
for each region.   
From Table 5.18 it appears that the monetary benefits of each program are 
heavily concentrated in East Gulf and Texas.  In both regional programs as well as the 
gulfwide OTB program these two regions collect over 75% of the aggregate benefits.  
Moreover, Texas collects over 40% of the aggregate benefits in all programs with the 
exception of the Regional SB program.  Given the amount of money spent in Texas, it is 
not surprising to see benefits concentrated in this region. 
 
Table 5.18 
 Total Rents Above Baseline (Present Value, $1,000) 
  Gulfwide SB Regional SB 
Gulfwide 
OTB 
Regional 
OTB 
FL $4,462 -$216 $27,350  $23,651 
AL-MS-
E.LA $24,448 $11,085 $48,876  $53,581 
W.LA -$38,048 $5,736 $27,224  $18,871 
TX $29,243 $7,377 $114,676  $88,036 
Aggregate $20,105 $23,981 $218,127  $184,139 
Max – Min $67,291 $11,301 $87,452  $69,165 
                                                 
58 To get these figures I sum the present value of rents in each region under each program and subtract the 
present value sum of rents under the baseline scenario. 
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Unlike the increase in CPUE, there is a very inequitable distribution of rents 
among the regions, under all four programs.  From the table above one can see that the 
most even distribution of rents, as measured by the spread between the largest and 
smallest gain, was provided by the regional SB program.  However, this program also 
generated substantially fewer rents than any other.  It is also interesting to note that the 
gulfwide OTB program generated more aggregate rents than the regional OTB program 
and these benefits were more equitably distributed.    
From Table 5.18 above one can see that Western Louisiana is actually worse off 
under the gulfwide SB program then under the status quo.  This is a unique result and it 
is worth diverting briefly from the equity discussion to provide an explanation.  One 
assumption of the model is that owners will not voluntarily leave the fishery when a 
buyback is in place.  In Western Louisiana, like each of the other regions, rents are 
initially predicted to be negative.  However, without any capacity reduction, positive 
rents are generated by the 3rd year.  Because the gulfwide SB program spends so little 
money in Western Louisiana, there are few changes in the fleet.  Under the Baseline 
Scenario, vessels exit the fishery in the presence of negative rents and this eventually 
leads to increasing rents in Western Louisiana.  While this result follows from a 
modeling assumption that boats will not voluntarily leave the fishery if a buyback 
program is in place, this assumption may be reasonable.  If the government announces 
that it will be paying for permits, those assets take on an option value that creates an 
incentive for the fishermen to keep them active even if normal fishery economics is 
working against them.   
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Texas Inshore Buyback 
From Table 5.18 one immediately notes extraordinary rent levels generated in 
Texas by both OTB programs.  With total rents of $114 million under the gulfwide OTB 
and $88 million under the regional OTB, Texas is far and away the most profitable 
region in the gulf.  An important factor contributing to this profitability is the presence 
of the state run buyback program in the inshore fishery.  The inshore buyback program 
in Texas removes vessels from the bay system, allowing more shrimp to migrate to 
offshore areas.   
In all regions total landings and total revenues tend to fall as vessels are removed 
from the fisheries.  This means that the decline in total landings resulting from fleet 
reduction is not being offset by an equal increase in the value of landings.  The result of 
this pattern for the present analysis is that declining landings have a negative effect on 
fishery rents.  In Texas, fleet reductions have a smaller effect on total landings than in 
other regions.   
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To illustrate the impact of buyouts on total landings I show the year-by-year 
change in landings with respect to changes in effort in Table 5.19.  Here I focus on the 
regional SB Program because it is the only program which led to reductions in every 
year.  Looking at the last five years of the simulation, one can see that the effect of effort 
reductions on landings was considerably smaller in Texas than in either Western 
Louisiana or the East Gulf region.  During this time large vessel effort was being 
removed from all fisheries but, since Texas was also removing effort from its inshore 
fishery concurrently, gulf landings were impacted to a smaller degree. 
The comparison between East Gulf and Texas is particularly informative because 
the CPUE is very similar in these two regions.  In Table 5.20 the CPUE was clearly 
higher in East Gulf than in TX, but only by an average of about 66 lbs/day fished, per 
year.  Looking at the change in landings with respect to changes in effort, one can see a 
much larger difference: removing 1 unit of effort from East Gulf resulted in an average 
loss of 750 lbs, while a 1 unit effort reduction in TX costs an average of 786 lbs.  From 
this table it is clear that, while East Gulf was slightly more productive than TX, the 
difference in the impact of effort reductions on landings between these two regions was 
well out of proportion to the productivity difference.   
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Table 5.19 
 Regional Sequential Buyback Program’s Change in Landings with Respect to  
Change in Effort (Change in lbs/ Change in Days-Fished) 
Year FL 
AL-MS-
E.LA W.LA TX 
1     
2 202.79 -1,091.63 -217.95 214.67 
3 151.48 70.41 -191.19 167.52 
4 285.94 958.89 758.54 902.11 
5 377.22 1,074.94 941.60 886.94 
6 304.56 1,072.38 1,630.51 1,027.26 
7 458.68 1,060.72 1,408.58 865.45 
8 470.41 1,194.99 1,626.00 1,010.76 
9 488.78 1,118.84 1,480.72 950.33 
10 463.38 1,290.54 1,968.09 1,047.67 
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Table 5.20 
 Landings and Effort Comparison for Regions 2 and 4 
 AL-MS-E.LA TX 
Year 
Effort 
(days 
fished) 
CPUE 
(lbs/day 
fished) 
Change in  
 Landings/ 
Change in 
Effort 
Effort 
(days 
fished) 
CPUE 
(lbs/days 
fished) 
Change in 
Landings/ 
Change in  
Effort 
1 17,397 1,162.56 40,915 1,066.24 
2 16,197 1,329.56 -1,091.63 34,936 1,211.98 214.67
3 15,089 1,422.02 70.41 32,126 1,303.33 167.52
4 14,060 1,455.92 958.89 28,772 1,350.10 902.11
5 13,439 1,473.52 1,074.94 27,334 1,374.47 886.94
6 13,190 1,481.10 1,072.38 26,175 1,389.84 1,027.26
7 12,918 1,489.95 1,060.72 25,504 1,403.64 865.45
8 12,684 1,495.39 1,194.99 24,909 1,413.03 1,010.76
9 12,491 1,501.21 1,118.84 24,397 1,422.74 950.33
10 12,374 1,503.20 1,290.54 24,058 1,428.02 1,047.67
Average  750.01  785.86
 
 
The primary reason that Texas is able to remove vessels from the offshore fishery 
with less impact on landings (as other regions) is because of effort reductions in the 
inshore fishery.  From Table 5.21 below, one can see that initially all of the inshore 
fisheries experience a sharp decrease in landings.  This is because the inshore fisheries 
are unprofitable at the start so many of the vessels exit in the first two years.  However, 
with open access, as profitability improves effort begins to move back into the fisheries 
and landings increase.  In East Gulf and Western Louisiana landings begin to increase 
steadily after the 3rd year.  Meanwhile, landings in the Texas inshore fishery fall by an 
average of just over 487,000 lbs per year throughout the 10-year simulation.  
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Table 5.21 
 Landings and Effort for Inshore Fisheries Under Regional Sequential Buyback 
 FL AL-MS-E.LA W.LA TX 
Year 
Effort 
(Days 
Fished) 
Change 
in 
Landings 
(‘000 
lbs) 
Effort 
(Days 
Fished) 
Change 
in 
Landings 
(‘000 
lbs) 
Effort 
(Days 
Fished) 
Change in 
Landings 
(‘000 lbs) 
Effort 
(Days 
Fished) 
Change 
in 
Landings 
(‘000 
lbs) 
1 1,604  9,921 32,586 12,466  
2 849 -458.11 7,539 -1,149.16 14,352 -12,519.24 11,839 -6.81
3 475 -235.47 6,810 -498.97 14,580 498.67 11,808 115.9
4 281 -127.32 6,816 70.61 14,886 347.88 11,769 49.55
5 172 -72.96 6,846 55.47 15,206 318.05 11,742 22.16
6 109 -43.76 6,884 43.37 15,529 302.31 11,722 11.55
7 70 -27.11 6,924 53.98 15,850 347.66 11,699 10.67
8 45 -17.11 6,967 44.78 16,180 309.52 11,675 1.7
9 30 -10.96 7,010 49.37 16,510 337.15 11,652 3.8
10 20 -7.12 7,055 39.71 16,844 303.92 11,633 -2.51
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Here I have presented several statistics on landings and effort in order to analyze 
the impact of the inshore buyback in Texas on offshore rents.  I have shown that the 
impact on landings of a one unit effort reduction in Texas is small relative to the other 
regions.  This is due, in large part, to the presence of the inshore buyback program which 
cuts landings from the bay system by an average of close to half a million pounds per 
year.  By reducing inshore effort, the small vessel buyback program helps improve the 
profitability of the offshore fishery in Texas. 
Program Evaluation Summary 
There were two main goals for the analysis provided in this chapter.  The first 
was to assess the cost and effectiveness of SB programs relative to OTB programs.  And 
the second was to compare a policy of multiple regional markets for buyback with a 
single gulfwide market for both SB and OTB programs.  Table 5.22 provides a 
composite of evaluation criteria. 
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 Table 5.22   
Four Program Ranking – Rank in Parentheses 
  
Gulfwide 
Sequential 
Buyback 
Regional 
Sequential 
Buybakc 
Gulfwide 
One-
Time 
Buyback 
Regional 
One-
Time 
Buyback 
Reductions    
Vessels 
1,543      
(3) 
1,383      
(4) 
2,398     
(1) 
2,314     
(2) 
Effort 
34,190     
(3) 
32,773     
(4) 
56,539    
(2) 
57,373    
(1) 
Productivity       
CPUE Increase 
381.49     
(3) 
365.11     
(4) 
654.25    
(1) 
554.86    
(2) 
Efficiency       
Cost per Permit 
$26,930    
(3) 
$28,918    
(4) 
$11,714   
(1) 
$12,138   
(2) 
Cost per Unit of 
Effort 
$1,169     
(3) 
$1,220     
(4) 
$513      
(1) 
$668      
(2) 
Net Profitability    
Present Value of 
Rents 
$38,364   
(3) 
$23,981   
(4) 
$218,127  
(1) 
$215,386  
(2) 
Benefits/Cost 
$1.37      
(3) 
$0.85      
(4) 
$7.76     
(1) 
$7.66     
(2) 
Equity (Rank Only)59       
Equity in 
Productivity 3 1 2 4 
Equity in Rents 2 1 3 4 
Average Rank 2.89 3.33 1.44 2.11 
                                                 
59 The equity measures used here are simply the difference between the region of greatest gain and the 
region of least gain for each program.  Equity in productivity for example is determined by the difference 
between the region of greatest CPUE increase and the region of least CPUE increase under each program. 
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It is clear from Table 5.22 that the OTB programs were able to retire more effort 
at a much lower cost than their SB counterparts.  These reductions resulted in greater 
productivity increases and greater increases in fishery rents.  The table also shows that 
the regional programs offered little advantage over the gulfwide programs.  The regional 
SB was almost categorically dominated by its gulfwide counterpart (ranking below the 
gulfwide SB program in 7 out of 9 measures).  And, while the regional OTB program 
retired more effort at a lower unit cost then its gulfwide counterpart, the gulfwide OTB 
program generated superior rents resulting in a more favorable rent/cost ratio for the 
program. 
The 2nd Best Policy 
In this chapter I have shown that, when offered the choice between buying back 
permits sequentially over time or spending the present value of a stream of sequential 
payments to buyback permits in a single year, more effort can be reduced from the 
fishery with the single upfront payment.  However, a prominent advantage to a 
sequential buyout is that it does not require a large initial investment.  Because of this 
very practical advantage, SB programs may still find a place in the regulator’s toolkit.  
Although, on the basis of rents, productivity increases and permit reductions, an OTB 
program would be preferred, for managers who chose the SB program for capacity 
reduction, understanding how capacity reductions influence fleet rents can help 
regulators run an SB program more effectively. 
Removing vessels from the fleet will have biological and economic impacts on 
the fishery.  However, many of these effects (such as an increase in abundance or 
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increase in size of shrimp landed) will relate back to the rent function.  Fishery rents are 
a compact measure of program success which captures many biological and economic 
relationships.  In the previous sections I have discussed how each of the simulated 
programs affects the rent function.  In this section I briefly discuss how vessel reductions 
in general impact fishery rents and how this information could be used to improve the 
efficacy of an SB program. 
In GBFSM, vessel reductions influence rents mainly through their effect on 
landings and the cost structure.  Landings affect revenues which, in turn, affect rents 
while cost has a more direct effect on rents. 
Conceptually, one expects that inefficient producers will be the first to sell back 
their permits.  The immediate effect of this exit will be to reduce aggregate cost relative 
to revenues and increase rents.  However, as profitability in the fishery increases 
remaining vessels have an incentive to expand operations, which tends to eat away at 
rents.  Because GBFSM is a homogeneous fleet model, fleet costs fall in direct 
proportion to vessel reductions.  Furthermore, effort in the fishery is assumed to be 
directly related to the number of vessels.  Therefore, the simulation model is not capable 
of analyzing these cost issues. 
The biological submodel included in GBFSM does, however, allow us to analyze 
the behavior of landings under buyback regimes.  The immediate impact of vessel 
reductions will be to reduce total landings.  But over the longer term, we cannot say a 
priori whether total landings will rise or fall with vessel reductions.  If the stock is 
overfished initially, and if overfishing is severe, then it is possible to see total landings 
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increase over the longer term.  Removing vessels, and hence fishing pressure, may 
improve recruitment, leading to increased abundance in later years.  Given the annual 
nature of shrimp fisheries, however, what the simulations actually show are total 
landings decreasing with vessel reductions. 
The effect of changes in landings on fishery rents comes through the revenue 
function.  Revenues are made up of total landings and value of landings.  Declining total 
landings have a negative impact on revenues.  However, this effect may be reduced by 
the size effect.  As total shrimp landings decrease, the expectation is that value per 
pound will rise as shrimp are allowed to reach a larger size before harvest.  While the 
impact of landings on revenue and therefore rents may be predicted a priori (with 
sufficient information regarding the yield curve), it cannot be know.  What the 
simulations show is that total revenues are decreasing with vessel reductions, meaning 
that the positive impact on the revenue function of value increase is dominated by the 
negative impact of volume decrease. 
Here I have discussed how vessel reductions relate to fishery rents through their 
effects on the cost and revenue functions.  Focusing on the SB programs, one can see the 
impact of vessel reductions on rents through time.  In simple economic terms one can 
think of the additional rents generated through vessel reductions as the marginal benefit 
of the program.  By examining the last purchased in each year it is also possible to 
calculate the marginal cost – the cost required to purchase one additional vessel.  These 
two quantities are shown below in Table 5.23. 
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Table 5.23 
 Marginal Benefit and Cost to Purchase One Additional Vessel for Gulfwide Sequential 
Buyback Program 
Year 
Vessel 
Reduction 
Marginal 
Benefit Marginal Cost 
1   $8,100 
2 494 $94,810 $8,750 
3 313 $75,680 $10,330 
4 309 $32,340 $13,470 
5 141 $29,290 $58,460 
6 59 $22,700 $230,850 
7 67 $15,130 $261,090 
8 59 $14,630 $259,270 
9 50 $12,780 $279,390 
10 35 $10,520 $493,840 
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   The table shows that vessel reductions initially have a very large payoff since 
marginal benefits greatly exceed marginal cost.  However, this payoff declines 
substantially as more and more vessels are removed.  By year five the marginal cost 
exceeds the marginal benefit by a factor of almost four and by the 10th year buying an 
additional permit under the gulfwide SB program only generates an additional $10,520 
but costs almost a half million dollars. 
In Table 5.24 below, I present the change in rents per dollar spent in each year of 
the sequential auction.  From the table one can see that by the 6th year the additional 
rents generated by the programs were less than the amount spent and therefore the 
change in rents per $ spent falls below 1 in these years.  Furthermore, by the final year of 
the simulation, the change in rents per dollar spent drops to a dismal $0.09 for the 
gulfwide SB and $0.14 for the regional SB.   
Although not as effective as OTB programs, SB programs offer managers an 
affordable alternative to expensive one-time programs.  Managers would have the option 
of ending the program if they see that the marginal costs are greater than the marginal 
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Table 5.24  
Change in Rents per Dollar Spent for Sequential Buyback Programs 
Year Gulfwide SB Regional SB
1   
2 $11.70  $11.31  
3 $5.92  $5.70  
4 $2.50  $2.19  
5 $1.03  $1.08  
6 $0.34  $0.54  
7 $0.25  $0.48  
8 $0.22  $0.32  
9 $0.16  $0.29  
10 $0.09  $0.14  
  
 
benefits.  In this section I have shown that the marginal benefit of vessel reductions 
declines over time and as such the SB programs generate very few benefits per dollar 
spent in the later years.  One relatively simple rule which may increase the cost 
effectiveness of the SB programs substantially would be to place a cap on permit price.  
Managers with a thorough understanding of the economics of the fishery will be better 
 169
able to place this cap appropriately, though even for the most experienced and 
knowledgeable managers, the difficulty of the task is significant. 
In sum, SB programs, although they do not compare favorably to OTBs based on 
the criteria presented in this chapter, may provide managers with a more cautious 
approach to buying back permits.  In a highly variable industry, such as shrimping in the 
Gulf of Mexico, the idea of “optimal” reductions will likely change drastically from one 
year to the next.  A SB program would allow regulators to update their purchasing goals 
and criteria as economic conditions in the fishery change or as new information becomes 
available.  In this section I have presented some evidence on marginal benefits and 
marginal costs of reductions.  Managers who prefer a cautious approach to reductions in 
capital may favor a SB program, the analysis presented in this section may help 
rationalize the use of a sequential program.  
Summary of Simulation Work 
In this chapter I have shown that OTB programs, by virtue of avoiding the 
speculative premium, retire more effort faster, and at a lower cost, then SB programs.  
This produces biological and economic benefits for the shrimp fisheries in the Gulf of 
Mexico under which are far superior to those generated by SB programs.  I have also 
shown that single market buyback programs perform better in the Gulf of Mexico then 
programs using multiple regional markets.  
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 CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This dissertation has provided a thorough analysis of the cost and effectiveness 
of sequential buyback auctions relative to one-time buyback auctions for renewable 
resource management.  For this study I have developed an empirical model of bidding 
behavior in a sequential license buyback auction.  I used data from the Texas Inshore 
Shrimp License Buyback Program – a long running sequential buyback auction – to 
estimate parameters of this model.  With these parameters, a model was developed to 
simulate two hypothetical buyback policies: a sequential license buyback program for 
offshore shrimp vessels in the Gulf of Mexico and a one-time buyback program for 
offshore shrimp vessels in the Gulf of Mexico.  Simulating two alternative programs for 
capacity reduction in the same fishery allowed for the comparison of the auction 
formats. 
 In Chapter II, a literature review on auctions and bidding was provided to 
establish some background for our study.  The literature on auctions and bidding both 
from traditional economics and environmental economics is very well developed.  
Furthermore, the game theoretic foundations of bidding, and in particular the elements of 
strategy involving one bidder against another, have been explored at length in the 
auction theory literature.  However, the topic of strategy as it applies to sequential 
auctions has received notably less attention.  A contribution of this dissertation is that it 
provides an in depth study of bidding strategy when participants are allowed to learn 
about the buyer’s value over the course of a repeated game. 
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 Chapter III gave a statistical summary of the Texas Inshore Shrimp License 
Buyback Program.  The objective in this chapter was to provide the basic motivation for 
our formal dynamic econometric model.  In Chapter III I showed that over half of all 
participants in the buyback auction placed bids in more than one round.  I also showed 
that the distribution of all bids placed in the auction becomes progressively tighter as the 
auction progresses.  In the first round of the auctions bids are distributed very diffusely 
but by the fourteenth round we see bids clustered very tightly around the average license 
price.  This suggests that bidders are learning about the agency’s willingness to pay as 
the auction progresses and using this informing in submitting bids. 
 In Chapter IV I presented an econometric model used to estimate parameters of 
the fisherman’s bidding function in a sequential auction.  The primary objective of this 
chapter was to estimate the parameters of the fisherman’s underlying benefit function 
and to distinguish this from the speculative premium induced by the sequential auction 
format.  This was done by first setting up a dynamic programming algorithm to solve the 
dynamic optimization problem characterizing the fisherman’s decision problem.  The DP 
problem was then nested inside of an estimation algorithm which searched for optimal 
parameters by minimizing the sum of squared errors between actual and predicted bids.  
The results of the estimation showed a speculative component which was initially very 
high and volatile over the early years of the auction but which leveled out over the later 
years.  The estimates suggest an initial speculative premium equal to 3.6 times individual 
benefits in the first round of the auction and a shape decline to 1.3 times individual 
benefits for the second round.  There was very little change in the speculative premium 
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after the 10th round as it stayed consistently between 1.8 and 1.9 times individual 
benefits. 
 In addition to providing the estimates needed for effective policy comparison, 
Chapter IV makes some important methodological contributions.  First, I use a Bayesian 
updating algorithm to introduce learning to our dynamic optimization problem.  This 
represents a contribution in the modeling of bidding under a sequential auction where 
information transmission is an important part of the decision problem.  Next, this 
analysis considered a control variable (bid amount) that is continuous.  This marks an 
important departure from previous exercises in estimation of dynamic decision problems 
(Rust 1988, Miranda and Schnitkey 1995, and Provencher and Bishop 1997) which all 
use a binary decision variable.   
 The main objective of Chapter V was to use a simulation model to compare the 
cost and effectiveness of a sequential license buyback program relative to a one-time 
buyback program for capacity reduction in the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery.  In this 
chapter I showed that the sequential buyback program, because of the speculative 
premium induced by this particular auction format, retires substantially less effort per 
dollar spent then the one-time buyback program.  In this chapter I found that, if faced 
with the choice of spending a buyout budget over several years or spending the present 
value of a sequential stream of payments in a single year, fisheries managers would 
usually be better off choosing the one-time auction format. 
 As is often the case with complex estimation, it was necessary throughout this 
dissertation to make some simplifications.  Although these were deemed necessary and 
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defensible, future work in this area should concentrate on refining the estimation 
algorithm.  In particular, there may be room to increase the precision of the point 
estimates by refining the grid search boundaries.  The grid search method was deemed 
the most appropriate algorithm to achieve maximization given the heavy non-linearities 
in the objective function.  However, future research may be able to add some precision 
to the estimates.   
 In addition to further refinements in the grid search, a second suggestion for 
future work is to concentrate on the structure that was imposed on the benefit function.  
Currently, the benefit function contains the explanatory variables price and vessel length.  
There was some evidence presented in Chapter III that license holder age should also be 
incorporated into the fisherman’s benefit function.  Because of the computational 
intensity of the estimation algorithm, it was not possible to add another variable to the 
structure.  However, future research that strives to improve the efficiency of estimation 
may provide an important extension to this work by making it possible to add more 
explanatory variables to the R function that estimates the value of a fishing license.  
 It should also be reiterated that the simulation results, presented in the previous 
chapter, were based on an earlier version of the model.  This model was parameterized 
using the best data available at the time.  Since then, data improvements have led to a re-
parameterization of the simulation model and updated results can be found in Woodward 
and Griffin (2008).  It should be made clear however, that the updated model bears no 
qualitative differences from the model used in this analysis.  While the results derived 
from the final simulation model differ quantitatively from those presented in Chapter V, 
 174
the conclusions presented in this dissertation regarding the performance of sequential 
auctions relative to one-time buyback auctions remain intact. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
BSAI   Bering Sea Aluetian Islands 
CPUE   Catch per Unit of Effort 
DGP   Data Generating Process 
DP   Dynamic Programming 
EEZ   Exclusive Economic Zone 
FAO   Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
GBFSM  General Bioeconomic Fisheries Simulation Model 
MAE   Mean Absolute Error 
Magnuson-Stevens Magnuson-Steven Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 
ML   Maximum Likelihood 
NMFS   National Marine Fisheries Service 
OLS   Ordinary Least Squares 
OTB   One-time buyback 
PV   Present Value 
RFP   Relative Fishing Power 
SB   Sequential buyback 
SSE   Sum of Squared Errors 
TPWD   Texas Parks and Wildlife Department 
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Figure A.1  License Holder Age by Round of the TX Shrimp License Buyback 
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Figure A.2  Average Vessel Length of TX Inshore Shrimp Fleet by Auction Round 
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